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Abstract 
The objective of this exploratory study is to assess the effects of within-host location determinants 
on the intensity of foreign investment as measured by employment in foreign-owned 
establishments. This statistical analysis is unique for its use of firm-level microdata from the 
National Establishment Time-series, which tracks business activity in U.S. establishments over 
time and isolates the universe of firms that were at one point foreign-owned from 2000 to 2011. 
Using a series of mixed models with time, industry, metro, and state fixed effects, this study finds 
that the most important drivers of employment intensity in foreign-owned establishments are firm-
level characteristics, vertical factors pertaining to labor supply and wages, local industrial 
specialization, business attraction subsidies, market capacity, and investor country 
characteristics. Measures accounting for business climate, human capital formation, and 
information-based assets did not generate substantial evidence of a relationship with the relative 
scale of investment in establishments, however more work is needed. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
 Foreign-direct investment (FDI) occurs when a foreign investor establishes a controlling 
stake in a business located in another country. FDI can arrive in the form of new physical 
locations known as greenfield or in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of existing domestically-
owned facilities. Many broad statements are often made about FDI. Compared to portfolio 
investment which holds a tighter relationship with exchange rates and short-run market 
fluctuations, FDI is typically viewed as a relatively stable form of capital investment and is thought 
to target companies with higher long-term expected value in locations that contain the necessary 
physical infrastructure, supplier networks, and market capacity to support growth.  
 
Those who characterize FDI as beneficial cite the active role of investors in corporate 
governance and positive externalities associated with multinational corporate (MNC) owners who 
have an incentive to transfer technology, best practices, and skills to reduce costs and enhance 
productivity of firms throughout their supply chain (Perkins, Radelet, and Lindauer (2006)). A 
further benefit for firms that vertically integrate into a parent company’s supply chain is that they 
often gain access to international markets and may begin to export downstream (Head and Ries 
(2001), Blonigen (2001), Swenson (2004)). Yet, debate continues as to the extent of these 
benefits and whether there is any observable difference in performance under foreign versus 
domestic owners (Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994), Lipsey (2002)). In particular, observers 
raise concerns about the long-term impact of downsizing following mergers, the weakened ability 
of overseas owners to monitor subsidiaries, and the growing practice of tax inversion which 
enables domestic firms to move their legal domicile to a lower-tax country through M&A (Scott 
and Jolly (2015), Keller and Yeaple (2012), and Hirschfeld-Davis (2014)). 
 
Despite these potential drawbacks, local and national policymakers continue to perceive 
FDI as an important source of capital and employment as evidenced by high profile government 
programs like Select USA and the billions spent each year on tax incentives by local 
governments.1 While the overall contribution of FDI is relatively small, amounting to less than 6 
percent of U.S. private sector employment, its presence is indicative of broader economic 
strength and global competitiveness since it tends to coincide with business activity that features 
above average compensation, value-add, productivity, trade, capital investment, and R&D 
expenditures on a per worker basis (see Table 3). The objective of this study is to investigate the 
1 Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy (2013) found that the largest 240 “megadeals,” or subsidy awards with a 
total state and local cost of 75 million dollars or more, had a cumulative cost of more than 64 billion dollars. 
www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals 
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location determinants of FDI by analyzing their relationship with the intensity of investment 
measured by employment in foreign-owned establishments. The results should help the research 
community better understand the effect of location determinants on the employment intensity of 
foreign-owned firms as well as policymakers seeking to better align FDI attraction policies with 
empirical research.  
 
Previous works find mixed results regarding the location determinants of FDI and their 
relationship with economic growth. Chakrabarti (2001), Blonigen and Piger (2011), and Eicher, 
Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) show that many covariates are not robust to changes in model 
specifications and are at times hampered by uncontrolled heterogeneity resulting from between-
host, cross-country macroeconomic comparisons. The contribution of this study is to investigate 
within-host differences using firm-level microdata from the National Establishment Time-series, 
which tracks business activity in U.S. establishments over time. This rich dataset isolates the 
universe of firms that were at one point foreign-owned, allowing researchers to evaluate 
employment changes while controlling for variation across firms, industries, and local areas. The 
clear advantage in using microdata within the U.S. is that the relatively homogenous lingual, 
cultural, and institutional conditions allow the model to better control the effects of within-host 
economic differences such as variation in business climate, labor markets, and market size 
across local areas.   
 
This study deploys a mixed model with time, industry, metro, and state fixed effects for 
the statistical analysis. The response variable is employment, which serves as a continuous 
measure of how intensely foreign firms invest into a specific corporate site. This study will perform 
two sets of regressions to assess how various location determinants drive the scale of foreign 
investment. The first set evaluates the moment of foreign investment for both greenfield 
investments and M&As, and the second surveys employment changes over all years 
establishments report as active (which includes years under domestic ownership).  
 
The objective of the first set of regressions is to uncover the factors driving the immediate 
site selection decision. The second set of regressions answer more general questions about the 
connection between location determinants and the growth trajectory of firms over time. The 
results from the second set of regressions may not be distinct to foreign-firms and could prove 
useful in illuminating a generalizable relationship between local area determinants and 
employment change. Understanding the effects of location determinants on growth within existing 
foreign-owned establishments is important since according to Census Business Dynamics 
Statistics during the period from 1977 to 2012, 62.6 percent of job creation and 65 percent of job 
destruction came from expansions or contractions in existing establishments. The second reason 
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for two regressions is that the effect of covariates on site selection decisions may diverge from 
the effect of the covariates on the scale of investment over time since asymmetric information 
about the expected versus realized asset value may influence the investor’s decision to increase 
or decrease the scale of investment and employment after the initial investment. 
 
  The study finds that the most important determinants of employment change in foreign-
owned establishments are firm-level characteristics, vertical factors pertaining to labor supply and 
wages, local industrial specialization, business attraction subsidies, market capacity, and investor 
country characteristics. Measures accounting for business climate, human capital formation, and 
information-based assets provide interesting albeit thin evidence of a consistent and robust 
relationship with establishment level employment patterns. While more research is needed, the 
most significant takeaway is that contrary to popular belief differences in a region’s business 
climate and human capital display a relatively weak relationship with establishment level 
employment patterns and that local industrial and workforce dynamics along with firm-specific 
effects play a more direct role in growth and the scale of foreign investment within the U.S.  
 
This study contains five sections. Section II gives the background and offers descriptive 
statistics characterizing inward FDI in the U.S., including its relative global position, industry 
composition, and source countries. Section III summarizes previous theoretical and empirical 
contributions on the spillover effects and location determinants of FDI. Section IV overviews the 
unique establishment database utilized in this report, describes steps taken to prepare and clean 
the data, and gives a thorough description of the covariate matrix including summary statistics 
and expected signage. Section V explains the model and results. Section VI concludes. Section 
VII provides bibliographic citations. Section VII is the Appendix which contains all referenced 
figures and tables. 
 
II. Background 
 
The U.S. has maintained a relatively dominant position in its global share of total inbound 
FDI. Since 1985 the U.S. has held the highest share of inbound FDI positions, rising to 40% of 
the world total in 1999, slumping to 16% in 2008, and then rising slightly to 17% in 2012 (see 
Figure 1). Although the U.S. continues to retain nearly twice the share of the next top ranking 
destination, the sharp decline over the past 14 years reflects an increasing fragmentation of 
global investment. Despite the sharp declines in global share, within the U.S. cumulative foreign 
direct investment positions measured on a historical cost basis continue to grow, rising from 
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$2.07 trillion in 2009 to $2.65 trillion in 2012 at an average flow of 180 billion per year (see Figure 
2).  
 
For developed economies such as the U.S., the primary source of foreign capital is 
typically other developed countries. In 2011, over 94% of U.S. employment associated with 
inbound foreign investment came from developed countries, with the United Kingdom accounting 
for 16.7% of all employment in majority-owned affiliates, followed by Japan at 12.2%, Germany at 
10.3%, and Canada at 9.7% (see Table 1). In terms of wages, the countries which offer the 
highest compensation per worker tend to have a greater presence in high wage industries such 
as finance, pharmaceuticals, or petroleum. For example, Bermuda, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
Finland, Ireland, and Switzerland pay their U.S. based employees $122,070 on average annually. 
The country with the most R&D intensive workforce in its U.S. based majority-owned affiliates 
was China, followed by the Caribbean Commonwealth nations. This result is consistent with a 
vertical investment framework given the relative skills-abundance of the U.S. compared to China.  
 
With respect to industry, 37% of employment in majority-owned foreign affiliates 
concentrates in the manufacturing sector (see Table 2). To put this in perspective, less than 9% 
of overall U.S. employment is in the manufacturing sector. Other dominant sectors include 
wholesale plus retail trade and finance, which account for 18% and 7% of foreign affiliate 
employment, respectively. There is considerable variation across industries in terms of average 
affiliate size. While manufacturing, retail, and professional and technical services industries 
typically staff more than 100 employees in affiliates, wholesalers, financial, and real estate firms 
usually staff less than 100 employees.  With the exception of wholesalers, the highest paying 
foreign-owned industries tend to be in technology and knowledge-intensive sectors. In 2011, the 
highest paying sector was finance, followed by professional and technical services, information, 
wholesalers, and manufacturing. These industries average per worker compensation ranged 
between $84,200 to 163,200. In terms of R&D employment intensity, the manufacturing sector 
was measured most intensive at 5.4%, followed by information services and professional and 
technical services, which both measured 4.5%. 
 
One of the explanations behind the higher performance of foreign affiliates is that they 
emanate from a group of highly-competitive, globally-engaged firms. These firms are better suited 
for overseas investment, have more complex supply chains, are larger in scale, more profitable, 
and likely rely on established business models that feature best-in-class technologies. Compared 
to the typical private sector firm, majority-owned foreign affiliates in the U.S. engage in 3.2 times 
more R&D, produce 3.7 times more exports and 5.1 times more imports, invest 2.6 times more 
capital, and generate 2.3 times more net income (see Table 3) on a per worker basis. In terms of 
compensation, majority-owned affiliates pay approximately 20 percent more per worker than the 
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average private firm. However, the exceptional performance of foreign-owned firms in the U.S. 
moderates when compared against firms belonging to a comparable peer group, namely U.S. 
multinationals. U.S. owned multinationals have higher profits, more capital investment and R&D, 
and close to the same level of compensation per worker as foreign-owned firms. This suggests 
that the performance benefits of foreign-owned firms derive more from firm-level characteristics 
that correlate with the capacity to invest abroad than their place of origin. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
A. Spillover Effects 
 
Moving beyond the background statistics, a major portion of the foreign investment 
literature documents the spillover effects on broader economic performance. Generally, the 
literature finds a strong positive relationship between inward FDI and productivity growth. 
Asheghian (2004) shows a positive and highly significant contribution on U.S. economic growth 
and total factor productivity.  Goss, Wingender, and Torau (2007) estimate that during the 
nineties FDI accounted for almost 16% of overall productivity growth, significantly higher that the 
domestic capital’s contribution. Lesher and Miroudot (2008) offer a similar assessment, and show 
that knowledge-related spillovers from FDI vary considerably across sectors with services 
industries experiencing greater productivity effects. Razin and Sadka (2003) argue that these 
productivity gains are particularly prevalent in foreign M&A, which accounts for the bulk of FDI 
activity in the U.S. Under their view foreign investors possess an information advantage about the 
firm’s true value and apply superior managerial know-how to realize the firm’s productive 
potential. Blomström, Globerman, and Kokko (1999) also trace FDI spillovers to specific firm 
actions such as a relatively higher prevalence of on-site training, tech transfer and licensing, and 
vertical linkages across value chains. Bode, Nunnenkamp, and Waldkirch (2012) examine over 
two decades of state level data and find that FDI generates positive externalities on aggregate 
productivity, while externalities from domestic firms appear negative. In a study of Mexican 
manufacturing industries, Jordaan (2005) finds positive productivity spillovers from technology 
differences between domestic and foreign firms in part due to geographic agglomeration. 
 
Relative to the productivity spillover literature, the effect of foreign investment on 
domestic wages is less clear. Early research by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1995) shows that 
higher concentration of FDI leads to higher wages in both foreign and domestic firms. Later work 
presents a more nuanced picture with effects varying according to industry characteristics. 
Axarloglou and Pournarakis (2007) find that depending on the industry, FDI inflows can positively 
or negatively drive wages and employment. Beyond industry differences, Balsvik and Haller 
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(2011) finds that while foreign M&A have neutral wage effects, greenfield investment increases 
demand for skilled labor thus increasing labor costs and reducing the productivity of domestic 
firms. Likewise, in a study of Central and Eastern Europe, Konings (2001) finds no evidence of 
spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms and, in fact, finds some evidence for the 
opposite effect which he attributes to a “negative competition effect.”  
 
An important point frequently overlooked due to data limitations is that many desirable 
effects typically attributed to FDI disappear after controlling for firm level characteristics. One of 
the first studies to make this argument was Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994), which found 
that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages and have higher value added per worker than 
domestic firms, but differences vanish after controlling for size and capital intensity. Similarly, 
Lipsey (2002) argues that there is a lack of evidence showing that foreign-owned firms pay higher 
wages and produce higher productivity spillovers. He observes that foreign-owned firms tend to 
locate in higher wage sectors, employ higher skilled workers, and tend to be larger, more capital-
intensive, and more intensive in their use of intermediate products. 
 
For these reasons, many of the observed benefits commonly attributed to FDI could 
instead stem from multinational corporate control. On this point, Pérez-González (2004) shows 
that multinational control drives improvements in total factor productivity (particularly in industries 
that depend on parent company R&D) and more investment in skill and technology intensive 
forms of production. Alfaro and Chen (2011) also find that multinationals fared better on average 
than local establishments with similar economic characteristics during economic crises. Desai, 
Foley, and Forbes (2004) supports this finding and show that multinationals access to internal 
capital markets affords a competitiveness advantage over local firms during currency crises. The 
research implication of these firm level studies is that foreign ownership may confound the 
ultimate effect of multinational corporate ownership on local economic growth. To take this into 
account, this study utilizes a highly granular firm level dataset to control for variation across the 
size, scale, and industry of foreign-owned firms. 
 
B. Location Determinants 
 
Given the potential economic development implications of FDI on productivity, wage, and 
employment growth, many studies have set out to understand the forces that draw foreign capital 
to local areas. For an excellent overview of the determinant literature, see Blonigen (2005). In this 
study, four sets of determinants are examined: 1) business climate, 2) vertical, horizontal, and 
export-platform factors, 3) agglomeration, and 4) information-based assets. 
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1. Business Climate: 
Hartman (1982) was among the first to introduce empirical evidence that changes in 
domestic tax policy strongly affect foreign investment in the U.S. More recently, Wijeweera, 
Dollery, and Clark. (2007) find that the U.S. corporate income tax rate exerts a negative impact 
on inward FDI, stating that: “a 1% increase in the U.S. corporate income tax rate would decrease 
FDI inflows by 1%.” Lanaspa, Pueyo, and Sanz (2008) show that tax rates on capital incomes 
affect location decisions and countries with lower rates attract more FDI. Across states there is 
considerable variation in tax policy. Hines (1996) finds that differences in state corporate income 
taxes significantly influence inward FDI, while the ability to apply for foreign tax credits against 
home-country tax liabilities can offset higher host state taxes. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) 
reveal that higher local indirect and income tax rates are associated with lower affiliate assets and 
output. Rogers and Wu (2012) also show that state business incentives including foreign-trade 
zones, the provision of better public services, and the establishment of overseas offices in 
particular countries increase FDI in the U.S. 
 
In terms of regulatory climate, Hanna (2010) shows the effect of U.S. environmental 
regulation associated with the Clean Air Act Amendments caused U.S. based multinationals to 
increase their foreign production in emitting industries. At the state level, Keller and Levinson 
(2002) use the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey conducted by the 
U.S. Census Bureau and find that differences in pollution abatement costs among states have 
had moderate deterrent effects on FDI. 
 
Lastly unionization policies seem to play a smaller, but significant role in firm location 
decisions. Bartik (1985) finds that differences in unionization, corporate taxes, and workers’ 
compensation insurance rate deter FDI. Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991) offer evidence 
that higher unionization rates and taxes deterred FDI, while higher unemployment, extensive 
transportation infrastructures, and larger promotional expenditures attracted it. 
2. Vertical, Horizontal, and Export Platform Factors: 
For many firms, FDI is an effective way to establish and expand a trade presence in 
foreign markets. Typically there are three types of trade related motivations: horizontal which 
targets the host country’s market, vertical which targets the host country’s factors of production, 
and export platform which takes into account third country trade opportunities near the host 
country. Greenaway and Kneller (2007) explain succinctly: 
 
“Vertical FDI occurs when the stages of production are located in more than one country; and horizontal when 
the same stage is located in more than one country. Vertical FDI is factor seeking; horizontal, market seeking. 
When there are more than two countries and more than two stages of production, multinationals are likely to 
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undertake more complex FDI choices which involve intra-firm trade and export platform FDI. The effect of 
adding more countries is to allow for the possibility of a horizontal motive for export platform FDI, adding more 
stages allows for a vertical motive.” 
 
Over the past decade a patchwork of evidence has accumulated documenting horizontal 
and vertical motivations. Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that large regional markets with good 
infrastructure attract horizontal foreign investment. Head and Mayer (2004) present further 
evidence that market potential matters for location choice.  
 
There is also a growing literature documenting the importance of workforce skill typically 
associated with the vertical motive. Yeaple (2003) shows that outbound U.S. FDI reflects an 
interaction between skilled-labor abundance and industry skilled-labor intensities in a manner 
consistent with the theory of comparative advantage. Using cross-state data, Axarloglou (2004) 
demonstrates that high industry and state specific labor productivity and high state spending on 
education enhance location attractiveness. Ford, Rork, and Elmslie (2008) show that FDI has a 
greater impact on per capita output growth than domestic investment in U.S. states with adequate 
human capital. Lending further support to the importance of human capital factor endowments, 
many studies in the developing context yield similar results: Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 
(1998) show that FDI contributes to economic growth only when a sufficient absorptive capacity is 
available in the host economy and Gachino (2011) also finds that positive spillovers from FDI in 
Kenya correlate with “systemic support structures, absorptive capacity, firm learning, firm training, 
and trade orientation.”  
 
There are a number of key differences between horizontal and vertical motivations. 
Horizontal FDI is typically considered a substitute with exportation to the host-country because 
locating production near consumers markets can eliminate the need to trade or reduce costs in 
bulk-gaining industries, while vertical is regarded as complementary since intra-company trade 
necessitates exportation between the host and source countries various stages of production. 
Evidence of these differences is robust. In early work, Lipsey and Weiss (1984) find that the 
higher the level of output by a U.S. firm in a foreign area, the higher the firm's exports from the 
U.S. to that area, especially in the case of intermediate products. As documented in Miroudot and 
Ragoussis (2009), vertical FDI responds strongly to distance-related trade costs. Similarly, 
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) uncover that sector and country specific transport costs and 
tariffs have a strong negative effect on export sales relative to FDI, indicating that when trade 
costs are present vertical FDI (which necessitates exportation) may decreases, while horizontal 
FDI (which avoids the need for host to source country trade) may increase. Using firm level data, 
Head and Ries (2001) find complementarity between FDI and exports and observe substitution in 
firms unlikely to ship intermediate products to overseas affiliates (which are likely horizontal 
firms). Blonigen (2001) finds substantial evidence for both a substitution and a complementarity 
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effect between affiliate production and exports with Japanese automobile parts in the U.S. 
market. Subsequently, Swenson (2004) shows the product level results match Blonigen (2001) 
and show that Blonigen’s findings apply to an even broader range of products.  
 
Since differences between horizontal and vertical motivations often blur in practice, there 
is a growing impetus to develop the Knowledge-Capital model of FDI that situates horizontal and 
vertical motivations under a common theoretical framework. To this end, Markusen, Venables, 
Konan, and Zhang (1996) demonstrate that vertical multinationals dominate when countries are 
very different in relative factor endowments, while horizontal multinationals dominate when the 
countries are similar in size and in relative endowments and trade costs are moderate to high. In 
a later work appearing in the American Economic Review, Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) 
find what appears to be strong empirical support for the knowledge-capital model. But Blonigen, 
Davies, and Head (2003) critique the method and argue that the underlying data support the 
predictions of the strict horizontal model (the precursor to the Knowledge Capital model), which 
shows that affiliate activity between countries decreases as absolute differences in skill-labor 
abundance widen.  
 
Building on these contributions, a number of articles document export platform FDI as it 
relates to third-country effects from surrounding markets with desirable qualities (either in terms 
of horizontal factors—like export potential, or vertical factors—like relative skill-labor abundance). 
Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) offer evidence for third-country effects in developing 
countries. Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) develop a three-region model and show foreign 
manufacturing affiliates of U.S. multinationals inside North America concentrate on home-country 
export platform, while affiliates inside Europe concentrate on third-country export platform. 
Garretsen and Peeters (2007) use a twenty year sample of outbound Dutch FDI and find 
evidence that third country effects and spatial linkages between markets influence location 
decisions. Kutan and Vukšić (2007) give evidence that FDI increases domestic supply-capacity 
leading to higher third-country exports. They hypothesize that the increase in third-country 
exports is because multinational companies may have better information about surrounding 
export markets and more advanced global supply chain integration than local firms.  
3. Agglomeration: 
As with many other topics agglomeration, industry clusters, and network effects play an 
important role in FDI location patterns. Guimaraes, Figueiredo, and Woodward (2000) show that 
service agglomeration demonstrates a very strong effect, as well as industry-clustering and 
“urbanization externalities” such as the distance from the principal city. In a study of Japanese 
manufacturing plants in the U.S., Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) find strong statistical support 
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that industry-level agglomeration plays an important role in location decisions. In another study 
using a similar dataset, Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten (2005) offer evidence of networking effects. 
They show that the stock of investment in a region by a firm’s vertical keiretsu partners and prior 
flows of investment into a region by a firm’s horizontal keiretsu partners increases the probability 
of investment. In a study of U.S outbound FDI, Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007) 
find that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of FDI are surprisingly robust to 
variables that capture spatial interdependence. In summary, the literature appears in agreement 
that agglomeration is real and significant in the context of FDI. 
4. Information-based Assets: 
There is strong evidence drawing the link between multinationals with information-based 
assets (like R&D) and location decisions.2 Kogut and Chang (1991) offer evidence that Japanese 
investment in the U.S. is drawn towards R&D intensive industries. Interestingly, when the data is 
disaggregated between M&A and greenfield investment there are indications that acquisitions are 
used for “the sourcing and sharing of U.S. technological capabilities.” Morck and Yeung (1992) 
further articulate this work and find that firms with non-rivalrous, non-excludable information-
based assets demonstrate a higher stock price reaction upon announcing a foreign acquisition. In 
a study of Japanese firms, Hennart and Park (1994) reveal that firms with higher R&D 
expenditures have a greater probability of investing into U.S. production facilities (but find no 
evidence that advertising expenditures have the same effect). They also document a “follow-the-
leader” effect among rival firms and a general attraction to locations with a concentration in high-
growth industries.  
 
Although the effect of firm-specific intangible assets based on R&D and marketing efforts 
explain investment in developed countries, Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) find that 
investment in Southeast Asia is more closely related to labor resources and inter-firm ties. 
Conversely, Chung and Alcácer (2002) find that firms in research-intensive industries are more 
likely to locate in states with high R&D intensity regardless the source country’s level of 
development. In a new branch of the literature, Keller and Yeaple (2012) develop a typology to 
classify intra-firm knowledge transfer into two groups: “embodied” (traded intermediates) or 
“disembodied” (direct communication).  They argue that disembodied knowledge transfer costs 
2 In a seminal work, Helpman (1984) introduces a general-equilibrium trade theory to explain the cross-
country penetration of multinational corporations and how “firm-specific assets associated with marketing, 
management, and product-specific R&D” in a source country can service production facilities overseas at a 
low marginal cost. Extending this theory, Brainard (1993) develops a two-sector, two-country model to 
illustrate how FDI decisions are most likely to occur when there are greater transport costs relative to fixed 
plant costs and increasing returns to the corporate level (i.e., R&D) than the plant level (i.e., scale 
economies). Dunning (2001) and Helpman (2006) further review the advances in multinational corporate 
trade theory and its implications on industry structure and cross-country trade patterns. 
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increase with distance, imposing a constraint upon intra-firm trade. This gravity effect is strongest 
in R&D intensive products and may play an important factor in multinational location decisions. 
Taken in sum, this body of literature offers statistical support for a relationship between state and 
industry level R&D intensity and the specific requirements of multinational corporate investors. 
5. General Surveys of Determinants 
 
Given the breadth of the FDI literature, a number of articles fit into what can only be 
described as general surveys of determinants. These studies help inform expected signage and 
present interesting information sets to inform variable specifications. Coughlin and Segev (2000) 
show that increased FDI in Chinese provinces has positive effects on FDI in nearby provinces, 
that economic size, average productivity, and coastal location are positive determinants of FDI 
location while average wage and the illiteracy rate are found to be negative factors. Hanson, 
Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) find that demand for imported inputs is higher when foreign 
affiliates face lower trade costs, lower wages for less-skilled labor, and lower corporate income 
tax rates. Axarloglou (2005) shows that labor productivity, tax incentives, and education spending 
are among the most important positive location determinants, while crime rates had a significant 
negative effect. Davies and Kristjánsdóttir (2010) show that fixed costs, distance, and trade 
openness appear to play a large role in the decision to invest in Iceland. Piteli (2010) finds the 
strongest factors influencing FDI location are overall business climate, firm profitability, and the 
overall productivity of the economy. Todo (2011) identifies the firm’s internationalization status as 
the dominant determinants of the export and FDI decision. Bode and Nunnenkamp (2011) show 
that employment-intensive FDI concentrates in richer states, while capital-intensive FDI tends to 
concentrate in poorer states. Gheasi, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (2013) find that the number of 
educated migrants has a positive effect on FDI inflows and outflows. Kornecki and Ekanayake 
(2012) provide evidence that real per capita income, real per capita expenditure on education, 
FDI related employment, R&D expenditure, share of scientists and engineers in the workforce, 
and capital expenditure have a positive impact on FDI inflows, while per capita state taxes, unit 
labor cost, manufacturing density, unionization, and unemployment rate exert a negative impact 
on FDI inflows. 
 
Despite the abundance of research, a number of analyses cast uncertainties on the 
robustness of many determinant specifications. Chakrabarti (2001) using Extreme Bounds 
Analysis finds that the relations between FDI and many of the variables often reported in the 
empirical literature (such as, taxes, wages, openness, exchange rates, tariffs, growth rate of 
GDP, trade balance) are highly sensitive to small changes in the information set, while market 
size of a host country, as measured by per-capita GDP is the most robust. Using Bayesian 
statistical techniques, Blonigen and Piger (2011) test various indicators and find that trade 
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openness, host-country business costs, host-country infrastructure (including credit markets), and 
host-country institutions are not robust covariates. Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) further 
examine the varying empirical results using Bayesian Model Averaging and find that half of the 
previously suggested FDI determinants are not robust. Moreover, there is still considerable 
uncertainty surrounding the profession’s understanding of what determines the location of foreign 
investment. 
 
IV. Data 
 
A. Overview of Establishment Dataset and Data Cleaning Process 
Turning to data in this analysis, the primary source of the firm-level establishment data is 
the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) developed by Walls and Associates and 
collected by Dun and Bradstreet (D&B). D&B provides the most comprehensive available listing 
of firms and operations in the U.S. which it collects through telephonic surveys and compiles as 
part of its real-time market intelligence business. According to Walls and Associates, D&B 
launches over 100 million calls per year from four call centers to maintain and update its 
database. Companies have an incentive to report accurate information because their participation 
affects their credit score and ability to access capital. D&B’s sources include the Yellow Pages, 
public records, financial and legal filings, government registries, third party data vendors, 
corporate announcements, and news reports. All the information is subject to extensive 
automated quality checks to identify inconsistencies through D&B’s proprietary Intelligence 
Engine.3 Walls and Associates’ then assembles the data into an archival database built from 
annual snapshots of the full Duns Marketing Information (DMI) file that contains over 52.4 million 
establishments between January 1990 and January 2012. Walls and Associates fits these 
snapshots into a continuous longitudinal data series. To ensure continuity during each reporting 
period, Walls and Associates uses a basic time-series imputation techniques to fill in missing 
information. 
 
Despite these stringent quality checks, as with any survey compiled from millions of 
human responses the records occasionally contain errors resulting from omissions, typos, 
erroneous and misattributed records. One issue in particular is that some establishments exhibit a 
“ratcheting effect” in reported employment levels. There are a few explanations for the effect. In 
3 Economist David Neumark and colleagues have published an academic article which checks the accuracy 
of the NETS database. Neumark et. al. examine the accuracy of employment levels, changes, relocations, 
and coverage of new firms. All of these correlated with public data sources except for year to year changes 
in employment. In fact, they generally found NETS/Dun and Bradstreet to have better coverage on small 
firms than the QCEW from the BLS.  
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most cases, the ratcheting is a result of rounding, irregularly updated personnel information, or 
the respondent’s confusion between the concepts of “establishment employment”, “campus-wide 
employment” if it is a multi-establishment site, and “company-wide employment” across all sites.  
 
To minimize inaccuracies, a smoother was applied to establishments displaying irregular 
growth patterns. The smoothers lead-lag weights were assigned in direct proportion to a 
composite error score based on the relative and absolute error within and between 
establishments and the contribution of that error to aggregate measures of employment change 
at the state and industry levels. After the process was implemented roughly 13,000 of the more 
than 3.7 million observations were altered, changing under 0.4% of the entire dataset. A small 
sample of the adjustments were cross-checked against an array of online resources including 
company websites, LexisNexis news reports, and satellite imagery (using parking spaces as a 
rough approximation of employment at the establishment). While it would be impracticable to 
manually check all the changes, the results of a randomized spot check suggest that on balance 
the correction led to a significant improvement.  
 
To mitigate double counting which occasionally occurs in the process of data collection, 
the author identified establishments with similar company names and employment levels at the 
same address. Establishments that were on balance larger, older, and active during a more 
recent year but were located at the same address and had a similar name were made the ‘true’ 
establishment while the others were removed. This duplicate identification process was designed 
to permit some multi-establishment site activity, while still reducing double counting.  
 
As a further quality check on the aggregate employment values, NETS data in the 
aggregate strongly correlated with the BEA’s estimates of employment in foreign-owned affiliates. 
See Figure 3 in the appendix for this comparison.4  
 
B. Response and Explanatory Variables 
As stated in the previous section, the response variable in this study is establishment 
level employment provided by NETS and measures the relative intensity of investment in foreign-
owned firms. The data covers the entire lifespan of all U.S. firms that were at any point majority 
foreign-owned during the period from 1991 to 2011. The primary advantage in using employment 
as the dependent variable is that it is the most reliable time-series metric available through NETS, 
functions as a useful ‘performance metric’ of economic well-being, and in most cases should be 
directly proportional to the scale of investment.  
4 For further information on the data cleaning procedures and other quality checks see the Methodological 
Appendix associated with the Brookings report “FDI in U.S. Metro Areas: The Geography of Jobs in Foreign-
Owned Establishments.” 
13 
 
                                                          
The data consists of longitudinal records of single physical locations (plants and offices) 
at which businesses operate. This study defines foreign-ownership as an establishment with a 
parent company that is located outside the U.S. that owns more than 50 percent of the business’ 
capital stock. D&B provides data that links establishments to their parent company. This data is 
collected during systematic reviews of each firm’s corporate hierarchy and legal structure. The 
process involves the examination of 5,000 of the largest global corporate hierarchies, including 
every family that has more than 250 establishments or $1 billion in annual sales. Alongside this 
process, additional ownership data is added from third party sources and in the normal course of 
tracking mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, and bankruptcies.  
 
The basic regression model sets each establishment’s employment level as a function of 
establishment-specific characteristics and location-based controls. While the underlying NETS 
data is available from 1991 to 2011, given the limited availability of reliable covariates over time, 
the regression analysis only covers a subset of the data from 2000 to 2011. The location-based 
controls build from the literature presented in Section III and include measures accounting for 
business climate, local trade, factor endowments, agglomeration, and source country 
characteristics. The following section describes each control variable’s theoretical significance, 
expected signage, and pertinent details about how each was constructed. Table 4 in the appendix 
lists all covariates and their respective sources. 
 
A number of covariates were initially included in the models, but were excluded due to 
lack of explanatory power and theoretical significance. These included: highway expenditure per 
capita by state, PK to 12 students per full-time equivalent teachers by county, school revenue per 
thousand PK to 12 student by county, eighth grade average math and reading scores by state, 
gross domestic product by metro, funds for industrial R&D by state, patents granted by metro, 
and international students spending by metro. 
 
1. Establishment-Specific Controls 
 
 Establishment-level characteristics influence a firm’s ability to grow and add employees. 
The following section discusses a series of controls of establishment characteristics such as age, 
headquarters and ownership status, and whether a firm trades internationally. These controls 
capture vital firm-specific information that can confound macroeconomic research on location-
decisions. 
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a. General Characteristics 
 
Headquarters: Establishments that have branches or divisions and are legally responsible for 
their activities are considered headquarters and are expected to be larger in size. If the 
headquarters is more than 50 percent owned by another corporation, it is classified as both a 
headquarters and a subsidiary.  
 
Age: Establishment age is a count variable that increases according to the number of years an 
establishment reports as active. Older sites are expected to employ more workers, holding all 
else constant. 
 
Parent-owned Employment in-State and out-of-State: Subsidiary establishments owned by 
the same parent company but at different sites are considered ‘siblings’. Parent companies have 
an incentive concentrate subsidiaries in one region before branching outwards to reduce 
monitoring and logistics costs. As a result, the marginal effect of additional sibling employment in-
state should be greater than the marginal effect of additional sibling employment out-of-state. 
These variables were tabulated by summing U.S. based employment owned by the 
establishment’s parent company in-state and out-of-state (excluding the establishment itself). For 
establishments without a parent, the value is reported as zero. It is possible to link 
establishment’s to parent company’s given the unique hierarchical coding structure embedded in 
the NETS Database. 
b. Ownership Status 
 
Foreign-Owned: As stated earlier, foreign-ownership indicates that over 50 percent of the 
establishment’s outstanding capital stock is held by a party outside of the United States. The 
foreign ownership binary is time variant and controls for foreign ownership. 
 
Originated as Greenfield or M&A: An establishment is considered originally greenfield if it was 
foreign-owned in its first year of operation. It is considered M&A if the establishment initially 
operated under domestic owners before a foreign company acquired it.5  These time-invariant 
binaries test if the mode of entry affects the employment level.  
 
5 Note, a subset of firms that were foreign-owned prior to the start of the data in 1991 could not be 
categorized as originating from either greenfield or M&A, and are thus left to the error term. 
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M&A Event: This identifies the year that a domestic firm transferred to foreign owners. M&A’s 
should have a negative effect on employment given the practice of downsizing that usually 
accompanies a merger. 
 
Post-M&A Event: All years after the M&A event are controlled using a binary to assess if 
establishments display a lasting post-acquisition employment effect. The economic reason to 
isolate the post-acquisition period is to see if firms that have been acquired are smaller due to 
downsizing. 
 
Years Post-M&A: This study uses a count variable tabulating the years following the M&A event 
interacted with the post-M&A event control to evaluate if there is a rebounding effect post-
acquisition. 
 
c. Global Trade 
 
Exports and Imports: This study uses information self-reported by firms on whether they export 
or import to examine the growth effects of global trade. This study used the modal trading status 
over time to remove variability in how establishments self-report year to year. Firms that trade are 
expected to employ more workers than firms that solely rely on domestic markets. 
 
2. Business Climate 
 
Conventional wisdom dictates that low taxes, tax incentives, flexible labor markets, and 
low costs-of-doing business play an important role in business attraction and local economic 
growth. While research mostly affirms these claims, the relative importance and cost of these 
factors is inadequately understood. This study tests the role of various aspects of business 
climate by evaluating the effect of taxes, subsidies, labor laws, and general cost-of-living on 
establishment employment growth and job creation across local areas. 
 
a. Taxes 
 
Domestic Tax Haven: A few states in the U.S. are considered tax havens for their low taxes and 
minimal incorporation requirements. In particular, the Department of Treasury Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network identified Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming as particularly well-known 
domestic tax havens. Using a fixed binary, this variable tests if there is any employment payoff (or 
opposite effect) in firms that operate in these states.  
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No Income Tax: A number of states cite their absence of an income tax as a selling point when 
attracting new business. To assess the effect of no income taxes on employment this study uses 
a binary for income tax free states, which includes Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 
Corporate Income Tax Rate: One of the most important factors associated with business 
climate is the corporate income tax rate. Using data from a variety of sources, this study tests if 
time-variant corporate income tax rates for each state have an effect on employment in 
establishments over time. Some states charge a graduated corporate income tax, in those cases 
this study applies the highest corporate tax rate available in that state. 
 
Value Added Tax Rate: The most common alternative to traditional corporate income taxes are 
value-added taxes which charge the purchaser of a firm’s goods or services. A few states have 
opted for this form of taxation including Hawaii, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Michigan. 
 
b. Subsidies 
 
Establishment Subsidy Value: This study uses data from Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker to 
test the effect of state and local government subsidies on job creation in foreign-owned firms. The 
Subsidy Tracker pulls together over 250,000 subsidy awards from over 500 programs in the U.S. 
using information disseminated through government reports and web pages along with 
unpublished data obtained through open record requests. The data itself contains the names and 
addresses of award recipients, which the author merged against NETS utilizing a fuzzy match 
algorithm that assigns a score reflecting the probability of a match based on the similarity of the 
corresponding name and address string. Matches with a probability below eighty percent and 
above one million dollars were manually checked by hand. The subsidy value is held fixed over 
the subsidy recipient’s lifespan. 
 
c. Labor Law 
 
Right-to-Work: Many Western and Southern states prohibit contractual agreements between 
employers and labor unions that exclude non-union workers or agreements mandate all 
employees to pay union fees. Business interests frequently lobby for this kind of legislation as a 
means to, as some proponents argue, enhance labor market flexibility. The following states are 
right-to-work as of 2011: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho (1995), Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska (1995), Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
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Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (1993), Utah, Virginia, and 
Wyoming. 
 
Employed Represented by Union: To account for unionization this study uses BLS data on the 
percent of employment represented by a union. This data refers to not only union members but 
also workers who report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by a union or an 
employee association contract. 
 
Minimum Wage: For some firms an important consideration in location decisions are labor costs, 
which in some industries are affected by relative differences in minimum wage laws. To account 
for these differences this study uses minimum wage by state. The Department of Labor maintains 
an archival database of minimum wage laws. 
 
d. Cost of Living 
 
Regional Price Parities: To gauge the effect of relative price levels on location decisions this 
study utilizes the BEA regional price parities which track regional prices by metropolitan and non-
metropolitan portions of each state from 2008 onward. These regional price levels are expressed 
as a percentage of the overall national price level for a given year. The price level is determined 
by the average prices paid by consumers for the mix of goods and services consumed in each 
region using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index program and the 
Census Bureau's American Community Survey. The price index was held constant for years prior 
to 2008. 
 
3. Vertical-Factor Seeking: 
 
Many firms base location-decisions on relative factor endowments. One of the most 
important components in a region’s industrial commons is the quality and supply of labor across 
industries. To evaluate the relative importance of labor inputs on establishment employment 
concentration and growth, this study uses a number of variables measuring the supply, 
compensation, and education levels of a region’s incumbent workforce. 
 
a. Labor Factors 
 
Employment: To measure the effect of a local industry’s labor supply on establishment 
employment levels, this study utilizes the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) as reported by Moody’s Analytics. This data quantifies the 
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establishment level employment effect of varying degrees of labor abundance across places and 
industries. Industries with more workers are more likely to exhibit robust labor markets as wells as 
agglomeration benefits and should therefore demonstrate better growth prospects. This measure 
also controls for the macroeconomic performance in the regional economy. The data are reported 
at the NAICS four digit level for each metropolitan, micropolitan, and rest of state area. 
 
Compensation per Worker: To test relative workforce skill-levels across industries and places, 
this study uses compensation per worker derived from Bureau of Labor Statistic’s QCEW data 
series as reported by Moody’s Analytics. While compensation per worker is not the perfect 
measure of skill (and in fact could be alternatively interpreted as worker cost), it should roughly 
approximate the skill-intensity of the labor-shed serving a particular industry. This is reported at 
the sector and NAICS4 level (depending on regression) and same geographic aggregation as 
employment.  
 
b. Human Capital 
 
Residents with Bachelor's Degrees: Human capital plays an important role in the growth 
prospects of a local economy and may directly affect the employment growth patterns within 
establishments. The measure used in this study to control for human capital is the total number of 
residents in each state who have completed schooling at or above the bachelor’s level according 
to the Census American Community Survey as reported by IPUMS.  
 
Bachelors and Post-Bach. Degrees and Certificates Conferred: Another component in a 
region’s human capital system pertains to the capacity of a metro’s higher education system to 
produce more educated workers. Using the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), this study tabulates the total number of awards conferred that normally require 
at least four years of full-time equivalent college-level work or at least one or more years of work 
beyond the bachelor's degree including doctoral degrees and first professional degrees. This 
measure reflects the flow of human capital from the education system to the labor market.  
 
4. Horizontal-Market Seeking  
 
Another driver of firm location-decisions are the sales opportunities that come from 
locating near a thriving consumer market. Regions that are larger and wealthier have more 
disposable income, and as a result represent a strategic opportunity to expand business for 
foreign companies. This study looks at an area’s wealth and population to test the appeal of both 
metropolitan and state consumer markets. 
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 a. Local Market Potential 
 
Local Serving Industry: For establishments in consumer-oriented industries, horizontal market 
seeking motivations play a greater role in location decisions and thus the scale of their operations 
should more directly relate to the local market’s consumption capacity, holding all else constant. 
To isolate these industries the author identified forty NAICS three digit industries involved in 
utilities, construction, wholesale, retail, transportation and warehousing, real estate, 
administrative support, education, health care, entertainment, accommodation, repair, and 
personal care.  
 
Personal Income per Capita: One measure of a local markets consumption capacity is personal 
income per capita, defined as income received by all the persons who live there, including wages, 
salaries, and contributions from government. This value is reported by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and is tracked in this study at both the state and metropolitan levels. 
 
Population: Another measure of a local consumption capacity is the number of individuals who 
reside in an area. This variable uses data from the Census Bureau's midyear population 
estimates at both the state and metro level.  
 
Population and Local Serving Industries: Since local serving industries must locate near 
population centers, the effect of population should be higher for these establishments. Thus, a 
significant and positive interaction term suggests that horizontal market seeking motivations may 
be more of an industry specific phenomena. 
 
5. Horizontal and Vertical-Trade Platform 
 
Firms that combine horizontal and vertical motivations in their location-decision are said 
to be using regional assets and location as a way to expand into nearby markets, otherwise 
known as export-platform FDI. These assets include local transportation infrastructure, logistics 
and trade networks. This study uses metropolitan-level estimates of domestic and international 
trade flows to account for the level of global trade integration in a particular place and its 
suitability as a trade platform.  
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a. Trade Platform 
 
Outflows and Inflows: Establishments in local areas with higher outflows to other domestic 
markets may be better situated to further their domestic reach. This study uses a measure of 
metropolitan domestic goods flows from the Freight Analysis Framework and Brookings Freight 
Series to measure goods sold to and from other domestic markets in 2010 at the local level. 
Given that the data is only available for one year this is a time-invariant metric held constant over 
the entire series.  
 
Exports and Imports: In addition to domestic flows, this study controls for goods sold to and 
purchased from international markets in a particular local area. Establishments in areas with more 
international outflows may be larger in scale given the opportunity to utilize their location’s 
business and infrastructure networks to access customers overseas.  
 
6. Agglomeration and Information based Assets 
 
Establishments that locate in industry clusters and urban areas are said to have greater 
access to shared knowledge assets and are more likely to exchange technical expertise with 
other enterprises. These assets derive from industrial specializations and the flow of workers and 
knowledge spillovers between industries and universities. Using a number of controls, this study 
evaluates if concentrated industrial activity which is commonly associated with more competitive 
economies and richer industrial commons, translates into direct positive employment growth 
within establishments. 
 
a. Agglomeration 
 
Industry Specialization: One way to account for industry clusters is through the use of location 
quotients, which compare an area’s employment concentration in a particular industry to the 
national average. Firms in industries with above average location quotients are more likely to 
experience the positive benefits of agglomeration and should thus display a positive relationship 
with employment. This measure was calculated by the author utilizing the local area employment 
data at the NAICS four digit level referenced earlier. 
 
Foreign-Owned Establishment Industry Employment: When firms make location decisions 
they sometimes copy the decisions of first-movers or rival firms. This behavior can create an 
observable herding or ‘follow-the-leader’ effect. To examine the validity of this phenomena, this 
study tracks the total employment in foreign-owned establishments in each establishment’s local 
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area (excluding the employment at that establishment site). A positive and significant result 
suggests the presence of bandwagon-style network effect among foreign firms consistent with the 
Hotelling model. 
 
Metropolitan Location: To test the effect of urban agglomeration on the scale of employment in 
foreign firms, this study uses a binary indicator to control for establishments located in 
metropolitan areas. 
 
b. University Assets 
 
Higher Education Research & Related Expenses: A common feature in dynamic local 
economies is the presence of large research universities. This study utilizes data from IPEDS that 
measures the total expenditures on research including institutional and academic support, and 
operations and maintenance to evaluate the effect of university research activity. Local areas with 
a more active university research system may enjoy larger technology spillovers on local firms, 
which may manifest in increasing employment levels. 
 
Higher Education Revenue from Private Grants and Contracts: Another way to evaluate the 
effect of universities on private firms is to assess the degree of revenue generated from the 
private sector at universities. Private revenue is defined as the total revenue received from private 
donors and contracts for specific services provided to the funder. This may include gifts, grants, 
and contracts that are directly related to instruction, research, public service, or other institutional 
purposes. Places with more market oriented institutions may have a higher degree of technology 
transfer and public-private sector collaboration and funding, which could lead to spillovers in 
establishments located in those areas.  
 
Flagship University: Another measure of university assets is if a local area has a flagship 
institution. Flagship institutions are either the oldest campus in a state’s higher education system, 
or it can simply mean it is a large and better-known campus. Each state has only one flagship 
institution. While flagship universities may not play a direct role in establishment growth patterns, 
they represent a location-based asset that may help foster a competitive regional economy. 
 
7. Source Country 
 
Characteristics pertaining to source countries such as their wealth, business climate, and 
trade volume have the potential to influence the scale of foreign investment that its companies 
pursue. For instance, countries with higher tax burdens or trade barriers could drive its home 
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firms to other markets such as the United States. Given the limited availability of source country 
data, these covariates are only featured in one set of regressions.6 
 
a. Income  
 
GDP per Capita: The relative wealth in an investor country may affect the likelihood of firms to 
expand abroad and locate employment in the U.S. This study uses gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population (in constant 2005 U.S. dollars) using the World Bank and OECD 
National Accounts data to account for country wealth effects. 
 
b. Business Climate 
 
Labor Tax & Contribution Percent of Profits: Some firms may locate employment in the U.S. 
to avoid labor taxes in their home country. To evaluate if increases in labor taxes abroad drive 
business to invest into the U.S. this study uses labor tax contributions as a percent of commercial 
profits, which covers the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions on labor paid by 
businesses from the World Bank’s Doing Business project. 
 
Profit Tax Percent of Profits: Another important business climate measure is the tax of profits 
paid by a business. Like labor taxes, profit taxes may drive foreign firms to locate employment in 
the U.S. if the rate in their home country is higher relative to the U.S. Profit taxes are taken as a 
percent of commercial profits and are reported by the World Bank’s Doing Business project. 
 
c. Trade 
 
Distance from Source Country: The author calculated rough distances between the site of each 
establishment and the distance to its parent company’s home country using a basic longitudinal-
latitudinal distance calculation. This measure tests if physical distance plays a role in location 
6 Source country data was acquired directly from D&B and includes all available location information on 
foreign headquarters of NETS establishments in the data series. Since D&B does not archive historical data, 
this universe of foreign headquarters consists of establishments reporting as active in 2013, the time when 
the data was acquired. Using this technique, over 94 percent of NETS establishments in 2011 had a 
matching foreign headquarters, however this match rate falls the further back an establishment reports in 
time. A number of factors contribute to missing records including suppressions from non-responses to 
survey inquiries, privacy requests from firms, or data quality concerns. In any event, it is unlikely that the 
lack of coverage disproportionately affects one country more than another, so the relative composition of 
foreign ownership by country of origin should remain unaffected. The source country data was only applied 
to a subset of the regression models. 
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decisions. Distance may explain the concentration of foreign investment in the east coast given 
its proximity to European markets. 
 
Container Cost to Export: Non-tariff trade barriers such as transportation costs play an 
important role in a firm’s ability to export to foreign markets. Higher trade costs create an 
incentive for firms to substitute exports with investment. One measure of trade costs are the fees 
levied on 20-foot containers. These fees include costs for documents, administrative fees for 
customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal handling charges and 
inland transport (and excludes tariffs or trade taxes). Countries with higher fees on container 
shipments should display a positive employment effect in their U.S. establishments, suggesting a 
substitution effect between foreign investment and exports. For more information about this 
measure see the World Bank’s Doing Business project. 
 
Trade Percent of GDP: To assess the relative complementarity and substitutability between 
foreign investment and exports, this study uses the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic product for each country. If the coefficient is 
positive it suggests a complementarity between trade and foreign investment and if negative it 
suggests a substitution effect. The source of this data is the World Bank OECD National 
Accounts data files.  
 
Manufacturing Value Added Percent of GDP: Manufacturing accounts for the largest share of 
foreign-owned establishment employment in the U.S and thus countries that are more 
manufacturing intensive could be more likely to employ more workers in the U.S. If this results in 
a positive coefficient it suggests that firms are investing horizontally into the U.S. For this 
measure, manufacturing refers to industries belonging to International Standard Industrial 
Classification divisions 15 to 37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The source of the data is the World Bank and OECD 
National Accounts data files. 
 
8. Industry and Geography Controls 
 
Two sources of variation in establishment employment over time result from the 
establishment’s location and industry. To account for time independent fixed effects of industry 
and geography, this study uses the NAICS four digit industry data and geographic data for states 
and combined statistical areas (metropolitan areas). 
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Industry Effects: NETS contains industry classifications at the six-digit North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) and eight-digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) levels and 
records these each year. To control for industry fixed effects, this study uses binaries for each 
NAICS four digit industry. To ensure that the establishments’ reported industry stayed constant, 
each establishment’s industry was based on their modal industry across time, with preference 
given to the most recent industry in cases of a ties. 
 
Metropolitan, Micropolitan, and Rest of State Effects: To control for metropolitan fixed effects, 
this study uses binaries for each combined statistical area in the U.S. The delineations are 
formulated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2009. There were 366 
metropolitan areas in 2009 and hundreds more micropolitan areas. Areas not defined as either a 
metropolitan or micropolitan area are grouped into regions covering the rest of state territory. 
 
State Effects: To account for state effects emanating from the different political, administrative, 
and institutional makeup across places, this study uses a binaries for each state and the District 
of Columbia. 
 
C. Summary Statistics 
 
Considering the role of these covariates in establishment size and growth patterns, 
Appendix Table 5 and 6 report average establishment characteristics across NAICS two digit 
sectors and states. The largest establishments that were at one point foreign-owned over the past 
decade tend to concentrate in the manufacturing sector where the average size was well over 
one hundred employees, utilities tend to generate the most revenue, parent companies with 
establishments in finance, retail, and extractive sectors tend to spatially concentrate their 
subsidiaries, establishments in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and professional, scientific and 
technical services tend to receive the largest subsidies, manufacturing establishments are most 
likely to self-identify as exporters, and information and professional, scientific, and technical 
services tend to concentrate in metros with higher compensation per worker, more population, 
and more research expenditures in local universities.  
 
Across states there is less variation than industries in the aggregate establishment 
averages. Generally the southern region of the U.S. displays a more attractive business climate 
with Kentucky and Tennessee offering the highest subsidy averages, almost all southern states 
charge below average corporate income tax rates and have less stringent labor regulations as 
measured by minimum wage and share of employment represented by unions. Coastal, 
northeastern, and states with highly populous metropolitan areas tend to display the reverse with 
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notably higher regional price parities, higher taxes, and more stringent labor laws. On the other 
hand, these places export more, contain higher levels of human capital as measured by 
bachelor’s attainment, and pay higher compensation per worker. These stylized facts are 
generally consistent with the anecdotal understanding of the differing business and economic 
conditions across the U.S. 
 
V. Model and Results 
 
A. Models 
There are two sets of regression models in this study. The first set is cross-sectional and 
examines the effect of location-based determinants on employment-intensity in foreign-owned 
establishments during their first year of foreign-ownership. The purpose of this regression is to 
isolate the effect of covariates on site selection decisions. The second set of regressions is time 
variant cross-sectional and evaluates the effect of location-based determinants on the varying 
investment intensity as measured by employment in establishments over time. This regression 
sheds light on the effect of location-based factors on growth in foreign-owned firms.  
 
The reason for using two models is that some determinants may drive investment and 
spur firms to locate more workers in a particular place, but have an entirely different effect on 
employment growth over time. For instance, parent companies may initially situate firms in a 
region because its other foreign-owned firms also locate in that area in a way consistent with a 
herding effect, but those firms may not grow as rapidly as firms that enter a region with fewer 
competitors. Taken together these regressions broadly assess the relative explanatory power of 
different determinants at different stages in an establishment’s lifecycle. 
 
The econometric approach uses mixed models that apply random effects and fixed 
effects across different combinations of industries and places. Mixed models are a useful way to 
test data with repeated observations for individuals within clusters, which in this case are 
establishments across time within places and industries. The advantage of a mixed model is that 
it combines both fixed and random effects estimators, allowing a test that controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity between industries, states, or metros while at the same time using the more 
efficient random effects estimator that assumes the unobserved establishment-specific effects 
within the clusters are uncorrelated with independent variables. A mixed model is preferred over a 
model that controls for establishment-specific effects because such a model would over-fit the 
data given that there are tens of thousands of establishments in the sample. Instead, the mixed 
model strikes a balance; it controls for group specific effects between places and industries, while 
avoiding overfitting that could lead to bias and less practical insight into the coefficients of 
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interest. The models in the regressions include a random, metro, state, metro-state, industry, and 
industry-state effects. All of the models include time-effects to control for macroeconomic 
fluctuations. 
 
The study performs a number of diagnostic tests on the regression models in order to 
validate their results. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier tests found no evidence that error 
variance across all establishments was zero, suggesting that there is indeed a panel effect. The 
Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that random effects alone is a more efficient than 
models with fixed cluster effects for industries and places. Wald tests also rejected the null 
hypothesis that fixed effect coefficients across industries and places are not jointly equal to zero. 
The Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation found that the residuals were weakly correlated 
with the lagged residuals. Lastly, the residual versus fitted plots failed to detect non-linearity or 
unequal error variance; the plots were moderately well-behaved and demonstrated the ‘random 
bounce’ and horizontal band around zero associated with constant error variance. Due to the size 
of the dataset it was not computationally possible to test the presence of panel-level 
heteroskedascity using an iterated GLS-likelihood ratio approach so one model was estimated 
using robust standard errors as a precaution. 
B. Results 
Overviewing the regression results, the first set in Table 7 which examined only the year 
of investment, covered 151,142 establishments and 80,287 establishments in the regressions 
containing investor country characteristics, hence the two regression sets.7  The second set in 
Table 8, examined the entire establishments’ lifespan including years under domestic ownership. 
This regression covered 1,026,137 establishment-year observations, combining eleven years and 
125,689 establishments. Most of the analysis uses models that restrict the sample to 
establishments that employ ten or more workers on average for a number of reasons. This is 
primarily due to computational considerations, but also justified by the fact that establishments 
with ten or more workers account for the bulk of employment and economic activity in the U.S. 
and thus are the primary population of interest. In any event, the first model in time-series 
regression sets includes all establishments and displayed insignificant differences with the 
random effects model that excludes firm with less than ten employees on average.  
 
Each set of regressions includes mixed models controlling for different combinations of 
fixed effects across industries, metros, states, and time. In both the year of investment and time-
series regressions the model with the highest explanatory power controlled for industry and state 
7 After running regressions 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a in Table 7 with the sample from regressions 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b 
containing the investor country characteristics, the coefficients magnitude, sign, and significance were not 
noticeably different, suggesting that sample used in the (b) regressions is unbiased. 
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effects, which had an overall R-squared of 12.16% in the moment of foreign investment 
regressions and 10.14% in the time-series regressions. Table 7 and 8 show all the regression 
results. The following section will focus on the consistency of the results across the various 
specifications, report significance and if results match expected signage, and discuss what 
insights can be taken, if any, from the within and between effects regressions.  
 
Establishment characteristics proved to be most important determinants on the intensity 
of investment as measured by employment levels in foreign-owned firms. The establishment’s 
age and status as a headquarters and as an international exporter/importer exhibit a positive and 
statistically significant effect on static levels and growth and provides consistent results across 
the various specifications. Holding all else constant, establishments that are headquarters employ 
37 to 42 workers and establishments that trade in global markets employ nine to twelve more 
workers. Because firms that belong to large multinational corporations are more likely to engage 
in trade, a greater multinational presence may explain part of this effect. A related finding is that 
companies are much more likely to locate high-employment establishments in states where they 
already operate. An establishment is expected to employ two to three more workers for every 
thousand workers that its parent company employs in the same state, compared to a rate of one-
half to one more workers per thousand that its parent employs in a different state. This finding 
indicates a strong clustering effect among subsidiaries of the same parent company and shows 
that the performance of subsidiaries within the same market are related to one another. 
 
The regressions also quantify the effect of foreign-ownership on employment, which is 
small, positive, and significant. Caution should be taken to not interpret these results as evidence 
that foreign ownership is substantively different from domestic ownership given that the dataset is 
heavily censored and only samples the universe of firm that were at one point foreign-owned.  
 
With respect to the mode-of-entry, establishments originating as a greenfield investment 
appear to display no systematic pattern in relative employment levels, however, firms that 
became foreign-owned through a merger or acquisition are usually around ten to eleven workers 
smaller in size relative to firms foreign-owned firms originating before 1991, holding all else 
constant. At the moment of foreign acquisition, establishments usually experience a relatively 
small, but significant negative effect from M&A. This decrease is offset after a merger takes place 
as establishments display a slight, but positive rebounding effect each year post-acquisition. 
These results are largely consistent with the expected negative downsizing effect of mergers, but 
seem to offer preliminary evidence that on balance firms improve in the years following an 
ownership change.    
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The next set of covariates represent business climate. In Table 7 all taxation measures 
and the minimum wage were not found to have a significant effect on the level of foreign 
investment as measured by employment. However, one area where there was an effect was in 
terms of right-to-work laws and unionization. Contrary to expectations establishments locating in 
right-to-work states tended to be smaller in size. The coefficient actually becomes more negative 
after controlling for state effects and the significance disappears after controlling for investor 
country characteristics. Also, unionization has a significant negative effect, however the fact that 
the coefficient becomes more negative after controlling for state effects suggests that states with 
more unions also display more unobserved pro-business characteristics that offset the true 
negative effect of unionization. In fact in the time-series regression, unionization has either a 
positive effect within industries or a weak effect on the scale of investment in establishments. 
 
By and large the business climate covariates were not found to have a consistent effect 
on the intensity of investment over time in Table 8 and in most cases displayed signs contrary to 
expectations (with the exception of value added tax rates, subsidies, and regional price parities). 
Because the business climate covariates are mostly reported at the state level, the regressions 
containing state fixed effects quantify the employment change in establishments that moved 
across state lines or that occurred within states over time, serving as a quasi-experiment. The 
results show that establishments in states without an income tax actually lost employees, but 
gained employees from locating in states with lower value-added taxes. The rest of the state level 
business climate variables displayed no significant effect in the state effects regressions.  
 
In Table 8 the taxation measures accounting for domestic tax havens and corporate 
income taxes, and unionization had significant results in the random and industry effects time-
series regressions. However, they all displayed opposite the anticipated sign. These 
counterintuitive results indicate that within and between industries the investment intensity 
decreases in states that are domestic tax havens, increases in states which charge higher 
corporate income tax rates, and increases in states with a higher percentage of workers 
represented by unions. Moreover, these odd results seem to run against the view that higher 
taxes and unionization hurt business attraction. 
 
Further, there was no evidence that minimum wage laws or the presence of right-to-work 
laws spurred increased investment or drove employment changes in either the site selection or 
time-series regressions (with the exception of the Table 7 regression (1b) which did not control for 
either state or industry effects). The cost of living as measured by regional price parities at the 
metro level had a significant negative effect within and between industries, but the effect was lost 
after controlling for state effects. Generally speaking, this empirical work, while largely 
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inconclusive, challenges the view that low taxes and lax labor laws entice firms to increase the 
scale of investment in their foreign-owned establishments.8  
 
Despite these inconclusive results, one measure associated with business climate that 
did have a positive consistent effect across all fixed effects specifications was the value of 
subsidies received by an establishment. For every million dollars in subsidies, establishments 
gained slightly less than two employees, holding all else constant (one to six employees in the 
site selection regression). While there may be a set of uncontrolled characteristics that make 
subsidized firms more likely to add employees, this result suggests that there is indeed a 
detectable ‘job creation effect’ associated with subsidies. Because the effect of subsidies is 
relatively small, this finding raises questions about the marginal benefit of tax incentives as a tool 
to increase the size of investment and create jobs. 
 
With respect to vertical-factor seeking motivations, the scale of investments as measured 
by establishment employment responded most strongly to measures reflecting the quality and 
quantity of each industry’s labor force. These results had expected signs and were significant 
across the all of the fixed effects models in Table 8’s time-series regressions. Measures 
accounting for industry employment had a significant positive effect over time, suggesting a 
benefit from locating near a large incumbent workforce in the establishment’s primary industry. 
Compensation per worker was also highly significant and positive and conveys a direct link 
between workforce skills and the scale of investment as measured by employment growth. While 
these coefficients remain small, they have a detectable effect and suggest that local 
macroeconomic conditions impose a real and positive effect on employment growth in firms, 
especially when the cumulative employment effect across the economy is taken into account. In 
the case of labor factors, Table 7’s site selection regressions presents a slightly more 
complicated picture with compensation per worker exerting a negative effect within states and 
between metros, yet that effect reverses after controlling for both states and industries. 
 
The vertical-factor seeking covariates also control for a number of human capital 
measures including educational attainment of residents and number of degrees conferred by local 
universities. Both measures display a faint but statistically significant relationship with 
employment in the random effects and within industry regressions in Table 8, but do not display 
significant results after controlling for within metro or state effects. The loss of significance 
suggests that unobserved state and metro characteristics that are correlated with human capital 
8 In the site selection regressions, the most significant taxation and labor law covariates were the right-to-
work and unionization measures. Both of these measures displayed consistently negative effects across the 
various specifications; showing that while unionization may have a negative effect on investment being a 
right-to-work state also does not lead to higher employment levels in foreign-owned firms.  
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better capture the true relationship. Another explanation for the faint effect of human capital is 
that these measures change very gradually over time, particularly relative to changes in 
establishment employment making the relationship difficult to detect. A final explanation for the 
weak effect is that there is relatively less variation in the human capital between states in the U.S. 
relative to variations between countries. As a result, human capital could matter more in the 
global context. Overall, these findings suggest that while human capital quality may be important 
for long-term growth, variation in the measures of bachelor’s attainment and degree conferral 
within the U.S. appears to have a weak effect on employment-related investment in 
establishments, however more work is needed. 
 
Another motivation driving the investment intensity of foreign-owned firms are horizontal-
market seeking factors which account for the sales opportunities in a given market. This study 
utilized population, average personal income, and an interaction between a binary representing 
local serving industries and population. These variables were evaluated at both the metropolitan 
and state geographic level. In both the site selection and time-series regressions, the local 
industry-population interaction effect put significant positive pressure on investment at both the 
metro and state level and across most fixed effects specifications (in both Table 7 and 8), lending 
strong support to the view that market capacity drives the number of employees in firms, holding 
all else constant. The magnitude of the state level interaction effect is slightly larger than the 
metro level interaction effect, suggesting that investors put greater emphasis on the demand of 
an area beyond the local market when deciding the employment intensity of their investment. At 
the state level average personal income of residents had the largest coefficient, however this 
variable was not statistically significant in the site selection regressions. This may indicate that 
potential investors do not factor average disposable income of the location surrounding their 
investment, but after investing it plays a role in retention and expanding employment.     
 
When an establishment locates in a particular area to access factor endowments and to 
use that location as a base from which to trade to nearby foreign markets it is said to be exhibiting 
export platform motivations. To test the relationship between how much a region trades and the 
presence of higher employment levels in its foreign-owned establishments this study uses 
domestic and international trade flows data for each metro area from a Brookings analysis of the 
Freight Analysis Framework. The results suggest that while there was little to no ‘export platform’ 
effect in the regressions evaluating the moment of foreign investment except an effect of exports 
within states and between metros, there was a significant positive effect for exports and a 
negative effect for imports in the time-series regressions.9 This finding is consistent with 
9 In the site selection regressions controlling for between and within state effects, metropolitan export had a 
positive and statistically significant effect, however this disappeared after controlling for industry variation. 
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theoretical expectations associated with the export platform framework and shows that places 
that export goods are more likely to host larger foreign establishments. Said differently, “metros 
that make” attract bigger firms than “metros that take.” 
 
Another area of investigation pertains to the relationship between agglomeration and the 
scale of employment-related changes from investment. To approximate the effect of industry 
clusters this study uses a location quotient. The results reveal a slight positive effect associated 
with higher levels of local employment specialization in the establishment’s primary industry in 
both the site selection and time-series regressions (the magnitude was also stable and did not 
vary across fixed effects specifications). This effect could be interpreted as a performance 
dividend from collocating near an industry cluster.  
 
This study utilized metro employment in other foreign-owned establishments to detect if 
there is any presence of a network effect among foreign firms. In the moment of foreign 
investment regression there appears to be evidence of a positive network effect, suggestive of a 
herding or follow-the-leader relationship. However, that effect becomes negative in the time-
series regressions which suggests the direct opposite; that there is a crowding-out effect over 
time. These seemingly contradictory results may be consistent with Hotelling’s law which 
observes that it is rational for producers to minimize product differences such as location even 
though that may adversely affect total potential sales in the long run. Finally, there was a positive 
and a detectable “urbanization” effect from locating in a metropolitan area in the site selection 
regressions using industry effects, but the effect becomes negative in the time-series regressions 
using state effects. While there is no clear explanation for this reversal, however controlling for 
industry does seem to absorb a lot of the negative effect.  
 
The last set of variables test the role of intangible information-based assets such as 
higher education research expenditures, the presence of flagship universities, and higher 
education revenues from private donors. The models find mixed evidence for these measures. In 
the time-series regressions there was no effect of higher education research expenditures, 
however higher education private revenues and the presence of flagship universities had a 
significant negative effect, opposite the theoretical expectations. In the site selection regressions 
using within industry effects, education research had a negative significant effect, while private 
revenue and locating in the same metro as a flagship university had a weak positive effect. 
Moreover, these contradictory results make it difficult to draw conclusions about the role of 
university research and industry engagement on the intensity of investment in foreign-owned 
firms. It is likely that there are better measures of information-based assets than these covariates. 
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The source country variables produced some evidence of a relationship with investment 
intensity in the site selection regressions to which they were incorporated. Parent firms in 
countries with higher trade and manufacturing value added as a percent of GDP were more likely 
to locate more workers in their U.S. establishments as the results were robust across each fixed 
effects combination. After controlling for the establishment’s industry, the magnitude of these 
seem to diminish somewhat but not enough to remove the effect. In the standard OLS and state 
effects regressions, increased distance between the parent companies and their U.S. based 
subsidiary had a significant negative effect however that disappeared after controlling for industry. 
There was a strong positive relationship between the profit tax in the source country and the 
intensity of investment in their U.S. subsidiaries, which decreased more after controlling for 
unobserved industry variation than unobserved state variation. Holding industry constant, the cost 
to export a container was positively related with the number of employees in a parent firm’s U.S. 
subsidiary. This result suggests that in some cases FDI may be a strategy for reducing the 
transportation costs of shipping goods exports to the U.S. Lastly, the wealth of a country and the 
level of taxation on workers did not offer substantial evidence of a relationship with source 
country labor taxes providing opposite the theoretically expected sign and GDP per capita 
providing insignificant results. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The main finding is that the most important drivers of the scale of investment as 
measured by employment levels in firms are establishment-specific characteristics, vertical 
factors pertaining to local labor supply and wages, local industrial specialization, business 
attraction subsidies, market size, and investor country characteristics pertaining to manufacturing 
and trade propensity. Interestingly the measures accounting for business climate, human capital, 
and local information-based assets were not as significant nor robust across various 
specifications nor fully in line with theoretical expectations. While more research is needed, these 
results suggest that the effect of business climate and human capital development on immediate 
job creation and the size of investment may be somewhat overstated. While these measures may 
play a role in the long-term growth of regional economies and overall capacity for growth or even 
in the global context, there does not appear to be strong statistical support for a direct role in 
foreign-owned firms in the U.S. over the last ten years. 
 
 There are a number of limitations to the model and results. First, the results have 
somewhat narrow applications since the study’s universe of establishments is limited to firms that 
were at one point foreign-owned. This is a major censoring and truncation issue that limits the 
generalizability and scope of this study’s findings. Ultimately, this limitation makes the analysis 
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more exploratory in nature than a pure empirical test of the location patterns of foreign-owned 
firms relative to their domestic counterparts. Additional data sampling non-foreign-owned 
domestic establishments would enable the study to speak more generally to the underlying 
drivers of employment growth in firms and whether location decisions are any different for 
domestically-owned firms as they are for foreign-owned firms. In addition, a broader sampling 
universe would better isolate the effect of foreign-ownership, especially in the case of mergers 
and acquisitions and could reveal how domestic firms respond to foreign takeovers and if there 
are any systematic similarities between firms that are eventually acquired. The inclusion of an 
identification criterion to control for multinational corporate owners and scale economies would 
also help to assess the differences in investment patterns across establishments. 
 
Another weakness is in the finding pertaining to business attraction subsidies in that it 
fails to take into account the selection bias within the universe of establishments that receive 
subsidies and the counterfactual about what would have happened had the firm not received the 
subsidy in the first place. A further limitation due to the exclusive focus on within-host differences 
is that the role of covariates that are relatively less variable in the domestic context could be 
understated. This is particularly true for human capital and business climate, which vary more 
significantly on a country to country basis, and should by extension play a larger role in the global 
decision making of foreign investors.  
 
Despite these drawbacks, the advantage in evaluating employment intensity in the limited 
context of firms that were at one point foreign-owned is that the location decisions of foreign 
multinationals may reflect a site selection calculation based more on due diligence and economic 
fundamentals than hometown preference. As a result, in surveying the location determinants in 
this study one can better understand what matters to sophisticated and objective international 
investors and could lead to broader insights into the drivers of investment and job creation more 
generally.  
 
Future research should continue to investigate the questions raised in this study. There 
are a number of additional covariates that were not tested and that could yield further insight 
including data on physical infrastructure, supply chain networks, improved source country data, 
various interaction terms, and foreign parent characteristics that distinguish vertical from 
horizontal foreign investment. For instance, future work could create an index of industrial 
similarity between the NAICS code of parents and subsidiaries in order to control for the relative 
“horizontalness” or “verticalness” of the investment.  Another improvement would be to further 
test the effects of information-based assets using covariates from the OECD REGPAT database 
which reports patenting microdata classified by companies, technologies, and metropolitan areas 
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or the Leiden University Centre for Science and Technology bibliographic citations database 
containing the number of academic publications that feature collaborations between university 
and private sector researchers.  
 
Given the research potential provided by the NETS database, a number of related 
research questions should be explored in future work. More research is needed to understand 
what happens to firms following an M&A event and whether FDI is a net-positive source of job 
creation. A Kaplan-Meir survival analysis with cumulative hazard ratios are potential ways to 
evaluate the probability of a closure or layoff event following a merger. General summary 
statistics aggregating year-to-year changes across establishments over time may also help 
quantify cumulative net job impacts of FDI.  
 
With this data it is also possible to test the probability that a firm becomes an exporter 
after being acquired by a foreign investor using a logistic regression approach. And given the 
ability to track establishment relocations it is also possible to evaluate the effect of different states 
on firms that changed locations. Finally, future research should continue to investigate FDI at 
lower levels of aggregation using covariates at the block and sub-metropolitan scale, especially to 
test variation in utilities costs or measures of internet connectivity and penetration. 
 
While it is still too early to prescribe urgent policy actions, the most significant implication 
from this exploratory research is that a “back to fundamentals” approach that leverages workforce 
skills, industrial specializations, and local market capacity may represent the most empirically-
grounded strategy to attract and foster growth in existing foreign-owned establishments. Although 
a large portion of the variation is unexplained in the econometric model, the theoretically 
inconsistent or weak effects of business climate, information-based assets, and human capital 
suggest that more research is needed in understanding how these conditions attract international 
investment and their role in driving the size and growth in establishments receiving foreign 
investment. Again, due to the exploratory nature of the study further work is needed to assess the 
robustness and reproducibility of these results. At a minimum, this research should help inform 
future work as it offers as an exhaustive look into possible location determinants and the strength 
of their relationship with the employment in foreign-owned establishments over the past ten 
years. 
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Table 1 
Country Name 
Majority-Owned Affiliates, 2011 
Employment 
(ths.) 
Share of FDI 
Employment 
(%) 
Share of 
Employees 
Engaged in 
R&D (%) 
 Compen-
sation 
(mil. $)  
 Compen-
sation per 
Employee  
All countries 5640.7  100.0%  2.9% 437897 77632 
United Kingdom 943.5 16.7% 2.6% 70287 74496 
Japan 686.6 12.2% 2.8% 53799 78356 
Germany 581.3 10.3% 4.4% 52068 89572 
Canada 546.9 9.7% 0.6% 36230 66246 
France 524.4 9.3% 3.8% 41377 78904 
Switzerland 446.3 7.9% 5.1% 43670 97849 
Netherlands 399.8 7.1% 2.3% 28506 71301 
Sweden 190.4 3.4% 1.2% 11628 61071 
Ireland 166.9 3.0% 5.9% 16499 98856 
Belgium 160.8 2.9% 0.6% 6812 42363 
Italy 120.7 2.1% 5.8% 8511 70514 
Australia 85.0 1.5% 0.5% 6518 76682 
Spain 81.4 1.4% 0.6% 5875 72174 
Other Europe 78.7 1.4% 1.7% 5204 66125 
Brazil 76.1 1.3% 0.1% 3733 49054 
United States 71.1 1.3% 4.2% 5992 84276 
Mexico 54.7 1.0% 2.9% 3441 62907 
India 45.1 0.8% 0.4% 2928 64922 
Other W. Hemisphere 41.4 0.7% 0.4% 4258 102850 
Singapore 36.9 0.7% 3.5% 2236 60596 
Bermuda 36.9 0.7% 0.3% 5889 159593 
Other Asia and Pacific 36.2 0.6% 0.6% 2124 58674 
Korea, Republic of 32.3 0.6% 4.3% 2681 83003 
Denmark 28.6 0.5% 4.2% 2592 90629 
Finland 26.2 0.5% 10.3% 2792 106565 
Israel 22.6 0.4% 6.6% 1966 86991 
Caribbean (UK) 21.6 0.4% 11.1% 1831 84769 
Hong Kong 21.3 0.4% 1.9% 1425 66901 
Taiwan 14.4 0.3% 2.8% 1270 88194 
Other Middle East 14.3 0.3% 2.1% 1013 70839 
China 13.2 0.2% 11.4% 921 69773 
United Arab Emirates 10.5 0.2% 5.7% 800 76190 
Other S. and C. America 7.6 0.1% 1.3% 1016 134048 
Saudi Arabia 6.8 0.1% 8.8% 840 123529 
Venezuela 5.0 0.1% 0.0% 673 134048 
South Africa 4.9 0.1% 2.0% 464 94615 
Other Africa 0.3 0.0% 0.0% 28 94615 
Source: 
Authors analysis of BEA Financial and Operating Statistics Table 
II.F2 
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Table 2 
Industry Title 
Majority-Owned Affiliates, 2011 
Affiliates with Assets, Sales, or Net 
Income (or Loss) Greater Than $15 mil., 
2011 
Employ-
ment (ths.) 
Share of FDI 
Employment 
(%) 
Share of 
Employees 
Engaged in 
R&D (ths.) 
Compensat
ion (mil. $) 
Compensation 
per Employee 
Less than 
100 
Employees 
100 to 999 
Employees 
Over 1000 
Employees 
All industries 5640.7   2.9% 437897 77632 52.1% 34.7% 13.2% 
Manufacturing 2081.3 36.9% 5.4% 175364 84257 34.6% 47.2% 18.2% 
Other industries 1542.4 27.3% 0.3% 74882 48549 57.3% 28.7% 14.0% 
Wholesale trade 546.6 9.7% 4.4% 50233 91901 59.3% 31.3% 9.4% 
Retail trade 488.5 8.7% 0.0% 16148 33056 31.7% 36.7% 31.7% 
Finance and insurance 409.1 7.3% 0.0% 66780 163236 72.1% 19.1% 8.9% 
Professional, scientific, 
& technical services 290 5.1% 4.5% 28660 98828 37.1% 47.3% 15.5% 
Information 242.3 4.3% 4.5% 23206 95774 47.6% 39.0% 13.4% 
Real estate, rental, and 
leasing 40.5 0.7% 0.7% 2624 64790 94.7% 4.1% 1.2% 
Source:  BEA Financial and Operating Statistics Table II.F1 BEA Financial and Operating Statistics Table I.A4 
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 Table 3 
  
Indicator 
Value, 
2011 
Dollars 
Per 
Worker, 
2011 
Ratio 
Relative 
to Private 
Industries 
in U.S. 
Private 
Industries in 
the U.S. 
Employees (Thousands) Table 6.5., Line 3 101,937     
Value Added (Billions) Table 1.5.5., Line 2 13,082 128,332   
Compensation (Billions) Table 6.2., Line 3 6,553 64,287   
Private Domestic Investment in Structures and 
Equipment (Billions) Table 1.5.5., Line 29+30 1,213 11,902   
R&D (Billions) Table 1.5.5., Line 39 255 2,504   
Goods Exports (Billions) Table 1.5.5., Line 47 1,474 14,456   
Goods Imports (Billions) Table 1.5.5., Line 50 2,235 21,921   
Domestic Industries Corporate Profits After Tax 
(Billions) Table 6.19., Line 2 1,037 10,169   
U.S. 
Operations 
of U.S. 
Parent 
Companies 
and Their 
Foreign 
Affiliates 
Employees (Thousands) 22,994     
Value Added (Billions) 3,161 137,463 1.07 
Compensation (Billions) 1,693 73,619 1.15 
Capital Expenditures (Billions) 528 22,955 1.93 
R&D (Billions) 220 9,580 3.83 
U.S. Exports of Goods Associated With U.S. Parents 
and Their Foreign Affiliates (Billions) 686 29,823 2.06 
U.S. Imports of Goods Associated With U.S. Parents 
and Their Foreign Affiliates (Billions) 923 40,160 1.83 
Net Income (Billions) 1,062 46,176 4.54 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
in the U.S., 
Majority-
Owned Bank 
and 
Nonbank 
U.S. 
Affiliates 
Employees (Thousands) 5,641     
Value Added (Billions) 736 130,548 1.02 
Compensation (Billions) 438 77,632 1.21 
Expenditures for Property, Plant, and Equipment 
(Billions) 177 31,430 2.64 
R&D (Billions) 45 8,018 3.20 
U.S. Exports of Goods Shipped by Affiliates (Billions) 304 53,839 
3.72 
U.S. Imports of Goods Shipped to Affiliates (Billions) 636 112,786 
5.15 
Net Income (Billions) 133 23,630 2.32 
Source: Authors analysis of BEA Table 1.5.5, 6.2, 6.5, 6.19; Outward Financial and Operating 
Statistics Tables K1-R2; Inward  Financial and Operating Statistics Tables A1-A9 
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 Table 4
Concept 
Group
Concept 
Subgroup Variable Label
Expect. 
Sign
Time 
Periods Level
 
Source
D-U-N-S Establishment Number n/a 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Year n/a 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Number of Employees in Establishment n/a 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Headquarters (binary), by Establishment + 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) in-State, by Estab. + 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) out-of-State, by Estab. + 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Age (years), by Establishment + 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Foreign-Ow ned (binary), by Establishment +/- 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by Establishment +/- 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Originated as M&A (binary), by Establishment +/- 2000-2011 Establishment 2
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment - 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Post M&A Event (binary), by Establishment - 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Exports and Imports (binary), by Establishment + 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Imports (binary), by Establishment + 2000-2011 Establishment 1
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State + 2000-2011 State 2
No Income Tax (binary), by State + 2000-2011 State 3
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by State - 2000-2011 State 4
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State - 2000-2011 State 4
Subsidies Establishment Subsidy Value ($ mil.), by Establishment + 2000-2011 Establishment 7
Right to Work (binary), by State + 2000-2011 State 3
Employed Represented by Union (%), by State - 2000-2011 State 5
Minimum Wage ($), by State - 2000-2011 State 6
Cost of Living Regional Price Parities (index), by State Metro Portion - 2008-2011 CBSA 8
Comp. per Worker ($ ten ths.), by NAICS 2/4 & Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA, NAICS 4 10
Employment (ths.), by NAICS4 & Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA, NAICS 4 10
BA/Post-BA Degrees Conferred (ths.), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA 11
Residents w / BA or Above (ths.), by State + 2000-2011 CBSA 11
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA 9
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA 9
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by State + 2000-2011 State 9
Population (mil.), by State + 2000-2011 State 9
Domestic Outf low s ($bn.), by Metro + 2010* CBSA 13
Domestic Inflow s ($bn.), by Metro +/- 2010* CBSA 13
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro + 2010* CBSA 13
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro +/- 2010* CBSA 13
NAICS4 Employment in FOEs (ths.), by Metro +/- 2000-2011 CBSA, NAICS 4 1
NAICS4 Specialization (LQ), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA, NAICS 4 10
Flagship Universities + 2000-2011 CBSA 12
Higher Ed. Private Revenue ($ mil.), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA 12
Higher Ed. Research Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro + 2000-2011 CBSA 12
Income GDP per Capita ('05 $ ten ths.), by Source + 2000-2011** Establishment 19
Profit Tax (% of comm. profits), by Source + 2003-2011** Establishment 20
Labor Tax & Contrib. (% of comm. profits), by Source + 2003-2011** Establishment 20
Cost to Export ($ ths. per container), by Source + 2003-2011** Establishment 20
Distance from Source Country (ths. miles), by Estab. - 2000-2011 Establishment 2
Trade (% of GDP), by Source +/- 2000-2011** Establishment 19
Mfg. Value Added (% of GDP), by Source + 2000-2011** Establishment 19
* Constant
** Interpolated
Data Source
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
ID Variable
Time Variable
Dependent Variable
Foreign 
Status
Trading 
Status
Business 
Climate
Taxes
Labor 
Regulations
Vertical 
Factor 
Seeking
Labor Inputs
Human Capital
Walls and Associates D&B National Establishment Time Series
Horizontal 
Market 
Seeking
Local Market 
Potential
State Market 
Potential
Horizontal 
and 
Vertical
Trade 
Platform
Agglomer-
ation
Netw ork 
Effects
Info. 
Based 
Assets
Univ. Assets
Source 
Country 
(2011 
universe)
Business and 
Trade Climate
Industry & 
Information-
Internet Searches
Author-compiled from various sources including Tax Policy Center, Tax Foundation, and Internet Searches
U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey
Wage and Hour Division of U.S. Department of Labor, State Minimum Wage History
Good Jobs First, Subsidy Tracker Database
World Bank, Doing Business Project
Establish-
ment 
Controls
General 
Character-
istics
Brookings analysis of EDR, Moody's Analytics, NAFSA, SABRE, EIA, Census, and BEA data
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Elementary/Secondary Information System

National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies, Survey of Industrial R&D, Table A-48
Tax Policy Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances
World Bank National Accounts Database and OECD National Accounts data files
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities, RPP1 Table
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Income and Population, Table CA1-3 and SA1-3
Moody's Analytics
Ruggles; Alexander; Genadek; Goeken; Schroeder; and Sobek. IPUMS. Minnesota Population Center, 2010.
National Center for Education Statistics; IPEDS Analytics: Delta Cost Project Database
Brookings analysis of EDR-derived data from Dept. of Transportation Commodity Flows Survey and Freight Analysis Framework
Author-derived
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 Table 5
Establishment Average by NAICS two digit Sector (2000-2011)
Agri. & 
Forestry
Mining, oil 
and gas 
extraction Utilities
Cons-
truction
Manu-
facturing
Wholesale 
trade
Retail 
trade
Transport, 
w are-
housing
Infor-
mation
Finance & 
insurance
Real 
estate
Profes., 
sci., & 
technical
Manage-
ment, 
HQs
Admin. & 
support 
services Education
Health 
care
Arts & 
rec.
Hotels & 
food
Other 
services
Employment, by Establishment 58.6 67.4 58.2 45.1 117.8 26.2 20.8 43.9 69.0 35.7 16.9 57.7 62.5 45.8 36.3 34.1 43.0 53.9 18.3
Age (years), by Establishment 12.9 12.6 12.1 10.8 12.2 11.9 11.5 11.6 10.1 12.4 11.6 10.3 10.8 10.4 11.9 10.4 11.3 12.2 11.6
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) in-State, by Establishment 0.4 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 2.1 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.8
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) out-of-State, by Establishment 2.7 5.5 3.8 6.1 5.3 5.6 18.4 7.2 4.9 8.0 3.4 4.2 3.1 8.6 3.7 10.6 3.8 10.9 9.7
Years Post M&A, by Establishment 2.5 2.9 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.8
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by State 6.6 5.7 7.1 6.3 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.9 7.0 6.3 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.7 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.5
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Establishment Subsidy Value ($ ths.), by Establishment 32.6 2.5 1.0 3.1 100.0 70.8 1.4 3.7 11.1 16.6 2.9 69.6 24.5 12.0 0.0 0.7 1.8 13.7 4.3
Employed Represented by Union (%), by State 13.2 11.2 14.9 12.7 13.6 14.0 13.3 14.1 15.6 15.4 13.0 14.9 16.2 14.0 14.4 12.5 14.2 13.7 13.8
Minimum Wage ($), by State 5.5 5.0 5.9 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.5 5.9 5.8 5.3 5.8 5.9 5.4 5.7 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.5
Regional Price Parities (index), by State-Metro Portion 97.9 96.3 100.7 100.4 99.8 101.6 100.9 101.3 104.6 103.1 101.1 104.0 105.1 102.1 103.1 99.1 102.9 101.1 101.0
Employment (ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 9.0 5.2 1.9 11.5 4.7 8.4 14.4 6.1 17.5 24.3 6.8 27.8 56.3 21.3 7.3 8.0 7.1 69.0 8.8
Comp. per Worker ($ ten ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 2.0 7.4 6.9 5.1 5.6 5.9 2.6 5.0 7.6 7.7 4.3 7.7 9.6 3.9 3.6 3.7 5.2 2.0 2.6
Residents w/ Bachelor's Degrees (ths.), by State 2443.9 2050.2 2035.6 2320.9 2391.7 2641.0 2398.4 2600.5 3015.4 2600.3 2544.4 2828.3 2507.6 2549.6 2778.7 2245.2 2767.0 2530.7 2433.1
Bachelor's/Post-Bach. Degrees Conferred (ths.), by Metro 9.7 11.0 23.4 23.9 25.7 33.5 26.1 32.8 48.0 37.6 29.9 42.1 55.4 33.2 38.5 22.2 33.1 27.7 26.5
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by Metro 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.8
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro 14.8 19.5 29.6 34.7 35.9 47.4 35.5 46.7 65.3 50.3 42.6 56.6 74.0 45.4 51.9 30.7 46.1 38.7 36.8
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by Metro 0.0 0.0 29.6 25.4 0.0 47.4 35.5 38.3 0.0 0.0 40.6 0.0 0.0 45.4 51.9 30.7 46.1 38.7 36.8
Pers. Inc. per Capita (ten ths.), by State 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
Population (mil.), by State 13.2 11.9 10.6 12.6 12.9 14.1 12.8 14.0 15.6 13.5 13.8 14.8 12.8 13.6 14.7 12.4 14.6 13.6 13.1
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by State 0.0 0.0 10.6 9.0 0.0 14.1 12.8 10.9 0.0 0.0 13.4 0.0 0.0 13.6 14.7 12.4 14.6 13.6 13.1
Outflows to Domestic (bn.), by Metro 48.9 70.8 77.1 84.1 94.2 111.8 83.5 112.4 139.6 111.4 101.6 122.6 156.5 103.5 113.8 80.2 106.2 95.4 90.7
Inflows from Domestic (bn.), by Metro 48.2 65.4 71.8 82.8 88.3 104.9 81.5 105.7 131.7 104.9 98.1 118.4 145.8 99.8 110.1 78.8 99.6 90.3 87.9
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro 7.2 11.0 11.9 12.4 13.8 16.0 11.9 16.0 20.0 16.1 14.7 18.8 22.4 14.9 16.4 11.4 14.8 13.5 13.4
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro 10.8 18.2 19.3 21.4 22.7 27.8 20.6 28.0 36.8 28.6 25.8 33.8 41.2 26.4 29.2 19.1 26.6 23.2 22.7
Four digit NAICS Specialization (LQ), by Metro 344.2 1889.3 129.8 120.1 289.4 134.9 109.3 188.5 175.0 119.0 127.6 153.6 112.7 117.3 123.7 104.1 137.8 114.6 109.5
Four digit NAICS Employment in FOEs (ths.), by Metro 0.0 1.2 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.9 2.9 4.0 0.2 3.2 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.4 0.2
Higher Ed. Research & Related Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro 240.9 276.5 584.0 530.4 571.9 714.8 569.1 701.5 1028.9 820.1 648.6 968.2 1184.8 734.8 853.7 496.7 687.7 601.8 597.1
Higher Ed. Revenue from Private Sources ($ mil.), by Metro 114.6 146.6 330.1 276.1 317.5 408.2 306.1 397.9 585.2 475.5 352.7 529.8 714.2 406.8 471.9 257.6 384.5 325.0 315.7
Average Share of Establishments Exhibiting Condition (2000-
2011), Percent
Agri. & 
Forestry
Mining, oil 
and gas 
extraction Utilities
Cons-
truction
Manu-
facturing
Wholesale 
trade
Retail 
trade
Transport, 
w are-
housing
Infor-
mation
Finance & 
insurance
Real 
estate
Profes., 
sci., & 
technical
Manage-
ment, 
HQs
Admin. & 
support 
services Education
Health 
care
Arts & 
rec.
Hotels & 
food
Other 
services
Headquarters (binary), by Establishment 14.7 14.3 15.8 14.6 18.8 10.6 1.3 7.7 15.8 6.8 7.0 15.2 41.9 6.7 8.1 4.1 7.0 2.7 3.4
Foreign-Owned (binary), by Establishment 58.9 64.6 57.1 65.4 69.7 73.2 67.1 78.4 64.0 67.0 53.3 64.1 70.7 67.6 65.2 53.3 55.2 53.6 65.4
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by Establishment 18.5 20.6 14.6 24.5 26.7 26.6 23.2 30.5 28.1 19.0 23.6 24.3 18.9 26.1 20.7 24.6 18.1 23.9 20.4
Originated as M&A (binary), by Establishment 68.7 68.1 81.8 67.2 58.0 56.9 64.9 57.3 65.2 70.0 65.4 70.1 74.7 65.2 68.7 72.1 77.0 62.9 72.8
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 6.0 5.8 8.1 6.2 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.5 6.2 6.1 4.5 7.1 7.3 6.2 6.5 5.3 6.8 4.6 6.0
Post M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 49.5 53.6 63.2 48.8 45.0 47.0 50.3 47.3 52.0 53.5 52.2 49.2 56.6 47.6 49.7 48.7 51.4 52.6 55.8
Exports and Imports (binary), by Establishment 3.6 2.8 0.4 1.1 10.9 5.0 0.2 2.8 3.5 0.3 0.7 3.1 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5
Imports (binary), by Establishment 6.6 1.7 1.1 1.6 7.7 7.8 0.7 7.4 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.7 1.0
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State 0.8 6.3 1.9 2.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.9 11.1 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.6
No Income Tax (binary), by State 21.9 35.5 14.3 27.0 18.3 21.2 21.5 23.6 16.8 15.8 27.2 18.2 14.0 21.5 21.1 24.8 19.5 19.9 23.1
Right to Work (binary), by State 43.7 58.9 26.9 48.3 37.7 38.7 43.1 38.1 28.0 29.1 45.9 31.5 24.0 38.0 35.4 46.9 37.8 38.8 38.2
Local Serving Industry (interact w/metro market size) 0.0 0.0 100.0 70.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 77.7 0.0 0.0 97.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Metro 64.4 66.5 75.2 89.7 86.3 92.0 89.8 89.5 94.5 91.4 91.9 96.9 95.8 93.8 92.0 86.9 93.8 89.5 93.8
Flagship Universities 11.9 9.0 19.8 18.2 15.8 16.0 18.5 16.2 23.1 19.6 17.2 25.3 27.0 20.2 21.7 17.4 17.8 18.7 19.6
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 Table 6
Establishment Average by State (2000-2011) AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DC DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO
Employment, by Establishment 40.3 48.3 58.2 29.3 41.0 40.7 60.3 32.0 50.5 30.8 45.9 46.7 48.9 26.6 59.6 63.9 40.3 64.3 32.0 52.0 44.3 63.0 61.7 58.6 54.0
Age (years), by Establishment 11.8 11.5 11.4 11.9 11.7 11.1 12.0 11.4 11.0 11.2 11.1 12.8 12.0 11.9 11.6 11.8 11.6 11.9 12.0 11.5 11.5 12.2 11.6 10.9 11.8
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) in-State, by Establishment 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.3
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) out-of-State, by Establishment 7.4 11.1 8.7 9.0 5.9 8.9 11.0 6.8 11.4 9.5 9.8 5.8 9.3 9.0 7.2 8.4 10.3 8.2 9.5 9.5 14.6 15.7 8.1 7.8 9.7
Years Post M&A, by Establishment 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by State 9.4 6.3 6.5 7.1 8.8 4.6 7.6 10.0 8.7 5.5 6.0 6.4 12.0 7.7 7.5 8.4 4.0 7.3 8.0 9.3 7.4 8.9 1.7 9.8 6.3
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Establishment Subsidy Value ($ ths.), by Establishment 0.0 0.6 42.6 0.0 44.2 0.7 62.2 0.1 0.0 1.9 1.2 0.0 87.6 0.0 18.4 6.0 0.5 556.4 51.6 22.7 0.0 24.1 51.8 2.4 20.2
Employed Represented by Union (%), by State 24.4 10.9 6.3 8.0 18.1 9.2 17.1 14.3 12.8 7.6 6.3 24.9 13.8 7.8 17.9 13.5 9.8 11.3 7.6 15.6 14.9 14.1 20.7 17.2 13.0
Minimum Wage ($), by State 6.9 0.0 5.6 3.0 7.1 6.0 7.3 6.9 6.5 3.5 4.8 6.5 5.9 5.7 6.4 5.7 3.4 5.7 0.0 7.2 5.8 6.5 6.0 5.7 5.9
Regional Price Parities (index), by State-Metro Portion 106.0 90.2 89.3 99.3 112.0 100.8 110.9 114.7 92.1 99.9 94.6 116.9 90.0 93.5 101.7 92.2 91.0 90.1 93.2 108.0 111.9 97.6 95.9 98.1 89.5
Employment (ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 1.2 1.8 1.5 12.1 22.7 6.7 3.8 27.1 15.5 10.0 12.8 4.0 1.7 0.9 26.0 6.6 4.2 2.9 3.1 17.3 15.5 1.8 11.8 11.6 6.1
Comp. per Worker ($ ten ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 4.6 3.9 3.4 4.0 6.0 5.0 6.5 6.5 5.9 4.3 4.7 3.8 4.0 3.6 5.4 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.1 5.9 4.9 3.9 4.9 6.2 4.3
Residents w/ Bachelor's Degrees (ths.), by State 112.2 664.1 357.8 978.6 6905.2 1114.7 841.1 196.7 157.8 3134.1 1580.7 252.6 490.0 220.2 2522.0 919.7 528.4 564.5 605.8 1698.6 1330.8 240.3 1666.3 1075.3 971.7
Bachelor's/Post-Bach. Degrees Conferred (ths.), by Metro 0.4 3.0 2.4 28.1 46.0 11.3 7.9 47.6 48.0 15.8 18.2 5.2 2.5 1.5 65.3 12.2 4.6 5.9 5.1 56.1 30.0 1.6 13.1 20.9 13.1
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by Metro 4.1 3.1 3.0 3.2 4.2 4.1 5.3 5.2 4.1 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.3 4.7 4.6 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.6
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro 2.4 4.9 4.3 28.0 66.1 15.8 9.2 53.0 46.3 28.5 34.0 7.0 4.0 3.0 74.1 16.8 10.5 8.9 6.9 35.0 33.9 3.7 27.7 24.2 18.5
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by Metro 1.8 3.1 2.8 19.4 41.0 9.6 5.2 25.0 24.4 20.5 21.7 5.4 2.2 2.0 42.1 10.5 6.2 5.3 4.8 19.1 22.8 2.1 15.3 15.2 11.8
Pers. Inc. per Capita (ten ths.), by State 3.9 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.9 3.9 5.0 5.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.1 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.3 3.9 3.3
Population (mil.), by State 0.7 4.6 2.8 5.9 35.9 4.7 3.5 0.6 0.8 17.7 9.0 1.3 3.0 1.4 12.6 6.3 2.8 4.2 4.5 6.5 5.6 1.3 10.0 5.1 5.8
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by State 0.5 2.9 1.8 4.1 21.8 2.9 2.0 0.3 0.5 12.9 5.9 1.0 1.6 1.0 7.4 3.9 1.7 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.7 0.8 5.6 3.2 3.7
Outflows to Domestic (bn.), by Metro 9.2 22.1 22.9 56.8 172.7 37.1 27.1 34.5 117.6 33.5 101.4 3.2 30.0 9.0 238.1 68.5 48.9 47.7 43.0 74.2 46.0 8.3 76.8 84.3 64.1
Inflows from Domestic (bn.), by Metro 6.5 23.8 23.7 71.2 137.4 40.2 25.6 95.2 115.4 59.8 117.0 8.0 26.9 10.2 216.9 64.8 43.9 48.6 36.3 75.1 81.4 10.5 73.8 65.7 61.8
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro 0.2 2.9 3.3 9.1 21.9 2.8 6.2 7.3 15.7 3.8 9.8 0.4 6.3 1.4 29.9 9.7 7.9 7.3 4.6 16.7 5.5 1.0 16.5 13.1 9.7
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro 0.6 4.4 3.9 10.5 40.0 10.7 5.8 32.4 29.1 10.2 18.2 2.4 5.0 1.8 50.2 13.0 11.8 8.5 9.7 20.6 19.0 1.8 23.2 18.3 14.4
Four digit NAICS Specialization (LQ), by Metro 1655.8 178.1 234.6 136.3 164.2 135.6 135.9 154.0 112.5 127.1 164.1 164.9 202.2 157.5 138.2 181.0 168.0 171.6 365.9 129.5 116.6 163.6 165.7 132.8 132.5
Four digit NAICS Employment in FOEs (ths.), by Metro 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.4 0.6 2.1 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 2.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 2.0 2.5 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.3
Higher Ed. Research & Related Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro 22.7 115.6 57.5 192.8 1072.2 202.1 147.8 983.0 1288.9 185.1 622.5 240.6 22.1 9.2 1265.2 236.4 53.7 110.0 146.4 2368.6 1073.0 14.0 172.2 491.2 247.4
Higher Ed. Revenue from Private Sources ($ mil.), by Metro 4.2 25.2 24.4 51.2 563.0 68.0 115.9 263.6 683.7 90.6 202.8 18.3 27.4 12.2 766.9 149.8 36.8 48.7 49.1 1274.1 378.7 28.2 73.9 189.4 159.8
Average Share of Establishments Exhibiting Condition (2000-
2011), Percent
AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DC DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO
Headquarters (binary), by Establishment 4.5 5.0 3.4 5.5 10.5 7.5 14.6 8.3 14.6 6.6 8.5 11.1 5.0 3.9 10.8 6.4 5.9 8.0 4.0 12.7 7.8 7.9 10.1 9.8 6.8
Foreign-Owned (binary), by Establishment 75.7 62.7 62.7 62.1 68.8 66.6 69.7 70.9 68.8 65.3 67.0 68.5 64.6 65.3 69.9 63.0 64.5 65.8 62.8 68.1 67.3 68.0 68.9 66.0 64.7
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by Establishment 26.1 22.3 25.4 20.5 24.0 25.9 23.4 25.4 26.4 25.7 27.8 24.1 20.4 21.9 25.9 24.1 23.4 23.7 21.8 23.9 25.4 20.2 26.0 27.1 24.5
Originated as M&A (binary), by Establishment 65.1 69.2 64.7 72.5 63.0 64.7 64.4 61.7 62.7 64.2 61.3 57.7 70.4 69.3 60.9 64.9 65.4 64.0 66.4 67.1 61.0 70.5 62.5 63.7 63.5
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 4.9 5.9 5.5 5.9 5.1 5.3 5.0 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.2 5.3 5.2 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.0 5.5 5.4 4.6 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.1
Post M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 53.8 50.5 48.3 49.6 49.5 50.0 51.5 48.1 48.4 49.5 47.2 48.1 54.8 52.8 48.7 50.7 50.4 50.4 49.5 52.0 48.1 54.6 50.2 49.4 49.8
Exports and Imports (binary), by Establishment 0.9 2.6 3.6 2.1 3.8 2.4 4.1 0.4 2.7 3.8 2.7 1.6 3.9 2.8 3.4 2.8 3.3 4.4 1.9 3.8 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.1 2.7
Imports (binary), by Establishment 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.5 5.0 1.4 3.7 1.5 3.6 2.4 4.4 5.8 2.4 0.9 4.5 2.9 1.7 4.1 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.1 3.1 2.3 2.5
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
No Income Tax (binary), by State 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Right to Work (binary), by State 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Local Serving Industry (interact w/metro market size) 71.2 63.1 63.4 69.5 60.8 60.8 56.8 47.0 56.5 72.9 65.6 78.2 54.0 67.8 58.4 62.0 59.9 59.9 67.8 55.3 66.3 57.4 55.8 61.8 63.5
Metro 68.3 81.4 69.5 94.0 99.2 90.9 95.4 100.0 86.8 97.1 90.0 72.2 65.6 72.3 92.1 83.3 75.5 73.7 85.2 99.7 95.9 69.5 90.1 85.5 87.3
Flagship Universities 13.6 4.3 14.8 16.4 16.2 7.1 33.6 100.0 78.6 1.1 1.1 72.2 3.7 1.2 0.0 1.7 2.4 14.6 18.5 79.4 37.5 12.1 4.4 73.5 2.3
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Table 6 (continued)
Establishment Average by State (2000-2011) MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV
Employment, by Establishment 43.2 23.4 49.7 31.7 47.7 54.6 56.6 26.6 36.5 49.7 51.5 41.3 32.9 52.2 52.8 56.7 40.1 52.6 47.8 42.9 43.3 34.2 35.1 62.8 59.0
Age (years), by Establishment 11.5 11.5 11.4 11.8 12.2 11.9 11.8 11.7 10.4 12.2 11.8 12.0 11.8 11.9 12.1 11.3 12.3 11.2 11.2 11.5 11.0 12.4 11.7 11.9 12.0
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) in-State, by Establishment 0.1 0.1 2.7 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2
Parent-owned Employment (ths.) out-of-State, by Establishment 10.2 8.7 14.3 9.3 8.8 10.8 8.0 10.2 9.0 8.0 9.7 10.0 9.3 10.5 13.6 14.8 8.3 11.6 6.8 11.0 15.6 11.3 7.9 8.1 12.0
Years Post M&A, by Establishment 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.5
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by State 5.0 6.8 6.9 8.3 7.8 8.3 9.0 7.6 0.0 7.6 6.4 6.0 6.9 10.0 9.0 5.0 0.0 6.4 2.6 5.0 6.0 9.2 0.0 7.9 8.8
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Establishment Subsidy Value ($ ths.), by Establishment 17.4 0.0 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.1 35.1 0.0 66.0 145.0 11.3 4.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 211.6 1.2 9.4 5.3 26.0 40.2 3.3 5.8
Employed Represented by Union (%), by State 7.7 14.8 4.3 8.7 10.6 11.6 20.3 10.1 16.8 26.4 16.6 8.0 16.7 16.3 17.4 5.2 7.0 7.6 6.4 7.3 6.2 12.6 20.7 16.3 15.3
Minimum Wage ($), by State 0.0 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 5.6 5.9 6.1 5.5 5.7 7.4 5.9 6.8 0.0 5.7 0.0 5.4 5.7 5.7 7.1 7.6 5.9 5.9
Regional Price Parities (index), by State-Metro Portion 88.8 93.9 92.5 88.4 90.2 106.3 114.0 94.7 99.9 115.7 90.7 91.2 98.2 98.9 100.5 91.8 87.5 91.7 97.8 96.7 104.0 100.1 103.0 93.3 89.2
Employment (ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 1.1 0.4 3.1 0.5 2.3 8.2 46.2 1.6 5.1 44.8 4.8 3.2 4.6 10.1 6.4 2.0 0.5 3.4 13.1 2.7 15.7 0.7 8.3 4.0 1.7
Comp. per Worker ($ ten ths.), by four digit NAICS & Metro 3.7 4.0 4.3 3.9 3.7 5.2 6.4 3.6 4.3 6.4 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.9 5.0 3.9 4.4 4.1 4.8 4.3 3.8
Residents w/ Bachelor's Degrees (ths.), by State 360.2 172.6 1505.7 112.4 311.6 287.5 2023.8 311.7 334.3 4163.2 1838.1 527.5 695.1 2224.9 215.4 690.7 127.6 917.0 3722.6 412.4 1716.9 143.1 1315.0 946.4 221.3
Bachelor's/Post-Bach. Degrees Conferred (ths.), by Metro 1.6 0.8 4.6 1.8 4.2 26.6 115.4 4.5 4.2 92.4 9.8 5.8 8.7 28.5 13.8 3.7 0.6 6.3 14.9 6.7 22.7 2.2 14.4 8.6 2.2
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by Metro 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.7 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.1 4.2 3.7 4.1 3.7 3.0
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro 3.9 1.5 8.7 1.3 5.0 17.3 161.4 4.8 12.1 130.2 13.1 8.1 14.3 28.7 16.0 5.6 1.4 9.5 37.3 7.5 27.1 1.5 23.1 10.5 3.3
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by Metro 2.5 0.8 5.6 0.8 2.8 8.9 95.2 3.3 9.3 70.5 8.3 5.4 9.1 16.1 9.7 3.5 0.7 6.8 22.2 5.1 18.1 0.9 15.4 6.0 2.3
Pers. Inc. per Capita (ten ths.), by State 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.6 2.9 3.6 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.0 4.0 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.8
Population (mil.), by State 2.9 0.9 8.9 0.7 1.8 1.3 8.7 1.9 2.4 19.2 11.5 3.6 3.7 12.5 1.1 4.3 0.8 6.0 23.2 2.5 7.6 0.6 6.3 5.6 1.8
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by State 1.9 0.6 5.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 5.1 1.3 1.7 10.7 7.2 2.3 2.4 7.0 0.6 2.8 0.4 4.2 14.1 1.7 5.2 0.3 4.2 3.0 1.1
Outflows to Domestic (bn.), by Metro 34.4 12.0 42.1 11.8 24.3 40.3 262.3 10.9 11.2 213.0 60.5 33.5 43.5 82.2 40.0 20.6 9.5 53.8 133.0 31.0 26.8 6.5 48.0 45.7 13.6
Inflows from Domestic (bn.), by Metro 35.3 9.7 40.5 8.2 21.3 41.4 241.2 13.4 30.0 193.9 56.9 34.9 42.9 78.3 33.5 23.0 10.0 44.2 123.4 31.0 54.8 8.6 59.6 41.4 16.3
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro 4.1 0.9 6.0 2.0 4.2 8.7 38.0 1.8 0.9 30.9 9.0 4.1 6.7 10.7 9.8 3.3 2.0 5.5 24.6 3.1 4.2 1.9 13.1 7.5 2.4
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro 6.7 2.0 7.1 1.8 4.3 10.8 76.7 2.3 3.5 61.6 10.6 7.0 6.6 18.3 7.7 3.5 2.0 6.7 37.9 5.2 16.0 1.5 13.8 8.7 3.0
Four digit NAICS Specialization (LQ), by Metro 230.6 222.0 168.8 349.5 179.8 144.2 138.4 324.2 1177.4 151.7 150.1 193.1 119.0 137.2 117.2 168.5 157.3 142.2 207.6 223.2 141.7 134.2 144.8 187.2 473.6
Four digit NAICS Employment in FOEs (ths.), by Metro 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.0 6.2 0.1 0.2 6.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.2 2.6 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3
Higher Ed. Research & Related Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro 28.3 17.5 119.7 29.7 85.5 1132.0 2108.4 157.7 52.4 1627.8 200.3 72.1 170.8 805.7 214.0 73.0 3.9 157.5 361.0 156.7 446.4 67.7 508.0 210.8 35.8
Higher Ed. Revenue from Private Sources ($ mil.), by Metro 13.1 4.7 71.9 8.0 55.3 606.6 1459.1 21.4 13.3 1142.9 92.7 51.9 102.5 397.5 210.5 34.3 5.3 87.6 196.3 52.1 137.6 37.9 116.6 118.9 11.9
Average Share of Establishments Exhibiting Condition (2000-
2011), Percent
MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV
Headquarters (binary), by Establishment 2.7 3.5 6.8 5.0 4.6 9.9 15.0 2.4 5.4 14.2 7.9 4.9 6.3 9.1 10.0 6.3 7.7 6.0 8.5 6.3 7.6 9.5 8.0 8.5 6.4
Foreign-Owned (binary), by Establishment 64.9 65.8 69.4 65.1 60.7 67.1 67.2 64.1 68.1 68.6 66.9 62.1 68.5 66.3 70.9 65.8 60.9 68.0 66.8 68.0 70.6 67.7 69.5 64.2 62.9
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by Establishment 23.4 25.3 27.3 24.3 18.3 24.6 24.4 22.2 27.4 22.4 23.3 21.1 23.6 23.2 27.1 26.3 20.1 27.1 24.7 23.4 26.0 20.1 24.7 23.3 25.0
Originated as M&A (binary), by Establishment 66.2 64.0 60.0 63.9 70.2 64.9 61.1 69.3 65.6 62.0 62.5 68.8 63.2 65.6 59.8 60.7 70.9 62.2 64.3 68.5 61.1 72.0 63.2 66.1 63.7
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.1 5.5 4.9 5.4 4.1 4.8 5.5 5.1 5.5 5.4 4.8 5.4 5.0 5.2 4.9
Post M&A Event (binary), by Establishment 52.1 51.1 45.8 52.9 51.2 49.6 46.8 53.5 49.3 48.8 48.3 54.5 49.7 50.0 46.2 45.8 52.4 49.5 48.9 54.0 46.7 57.3 50.8 48.7 48.2
Exports and Imports (binary), by Establishment 1.6 1.0 2.7 2.6 1.9 6.6 4.5 0.7 1.6 3.2 3.5 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.0 2.2 4.4 2.8 2.9 2.2 1.9 5.4 3.6 4.4 2.8
Imports (binary), by Establishment 2.9 0.9 3.5 1.0 0.9 2.6 6.7 0.7 1.9 4.6 3.2 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.6 5.7 1.7 3.6 3.1 1.5 2.3 1.3 3.1 2.7 2.1
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
No Income Tax (binary), by State 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Right to Work (binary), by State 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Local Serving Industry (interact w/metro market size) 66.3 61.7 63.1 63.9 54.2 50.3 59.3 66.2 71.0 55.7 62.8 62.6 64.5 56.1 60.4 64.8 49.5 69.5 60.9 66.8 68.6 55.8 65.7 54.1 62.4
Metro 51.3 46.9 81.0 51.7 64.4 70.2 100.0 75.9 91.4 94.0 87.5 76.2 87.7 90.6 100.0 83.2 53.8 85.3 93.2 90.3 92.4 46.9 94.6 83.0 63.4
Flagship Universities 0.9 13.0 5.8 9.6 14.7 34.8 11.4 52.6 25.4 8.0 16.6 38.8 7.3 37.1 100.0 17.2 0.8 12.1 6.4 60.5 40.8 46.9 65.2 11.3 9.3
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
OLS Industry 
Effects
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
OLS Industry 
Effects
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
79.823*** 70.452*** 79.667*** 70.325*** 83.429*** 74.209*** 83.166*** 74.045***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.421*** 1.718*** 1.432*** 1.722*** 1.679*** 1.872*** 1.700*** 1.875***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4.165*** 4.861*** 4.185*** 4.857*** 6.482*** 6.921*** 6.559*** 6.968***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.198*** 0.247*** 0.198*** 0.244*** 0.102*** 0.192*** 0.101*** 0.185***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
-1.454 -4.321** -1.565 -4.350** 2.876 -2.422 2.605 -2.439
(0.473) (0.030) (0.439) (0.029) (0.350) (0.425) (0.397) (0.422)
-14.781*** -17.208*** -15.018*** -17.305*** -12.134*** -15.937*** -12.544*** -16.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
51.711*** 32.944*** 51.751*** 33.117*** 42.441*** 24.292*** 42.478*** 24.451***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
36.048*** 20.564*** 35.676*** 20.485*** 36.708*** 22.974*** 36.606*** 23.100***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.792 2.153 9.227 5.969 1.672 3.158 -22.625 -9.197
(0.814) (0.514) (0.411) (0.588) (0.728) (0.501) (0.182) (0.580)
-1.293 1.448 -9.774* -7.107 -2.248 1.967 9.733 5.900
(0.372) (0.309) (0.099) (0.221) (0.266) (0.320) (0.228) (0.455)
0.130 0.491* 0.097 0.388 -0.285 0.287 0.205 0.809
(0.622) (0.057) (0.858) (0.466) (0.429) (0.417) (0.778) (0.254)
-0.438 -0.078 -5.539* -2.010 -2.936 -1.865 -11.471*** -4.605
(0.792) (0.962) (0.062) (0.490) (0.203) (0.409) (0.004) (0.238)
1.699*** 1.398*** 1.701*** 1.400*** 6.443*** 4.141*** 6.471*** 4.202***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-8.484*** -6.334*** -21.646*** -15.129*** -11.058*** -8.823*** -12.129 -5.624
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.456)
-0.399*** -0.346** -1.287*** -0.889** 0.038 -0.131 -2.052*** -1.193**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.033) (0.846) (0.492) (0.001) (0.040)
-0.054 0.136 -0.538 -0.084 -0.785** -0.366 -0.810 -0.002
(0.827) (0.577) (0.214) (0.844) (0.021) (0.273) (0.172) (0.997)
-0.268*** -0.157 -0.013 0.042 -0.317** -0.212 -0.179 -0.096
(0.006) (0.101) (0.932) (0.777) (0.021) (0.114) (0.391) (0.637)
-0.031* 0.070*** -0.031* 0.070*** -0.079*** 0.044 -0.078*** 0.043
(0.054) (0.001) (0.054) (0.001) (0.002) (0.174) (0.002) (0.180)
-1.026*** 0.365** -0.996*** 0.409** -1.287*** 1.304*** -1.270*** 1.443***
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
0.002 0.003 0.010** 0.009** 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.007
(0.334) (0.255) (0.016) (0.031) (0.325) (0.208) (0.127) (0.222)
-0.138** -0.118** -0.148** -0.159** -0.231*** -0.214*** -0.166 -0.207**
(0.023) (0.049) (0.050) (0.032) (0.005) (0.009) (0.106) (0.039)
Residents w / Bachelor's Degrees 
(ths.), by State
Bachelor's/Post-Bach. Degrees & 
Certif icates Conferred (ths.), by Metro
Cost of Living Regional Price Parities (index), by 
State-Metro Portion
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es
s 
C
lim
at
e
Taxes
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State
No Income Tax (binary), by State
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by 
State
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment
Trading Status
Exports and Imports (binary), by 
Establishment
Imports (binary), by Establishment
Age (years), by Establishment
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) in-
State, by Establishment
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) out-
of-State, by Establishment
Table 7
Determinants of Number of Employmees in Foreign-Owned Establishment (One-Period Year of Investment)
GROUPS COVARIATES
Dependent: Average Number of Employees in Foreign-Ow ned Establishments
E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t C
on
tro
ls
General 
Characteristics
Headquarters (binary), by 
Establishment
Foreign Status
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by 
Establishment
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
OLS Industry 
Effects
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
OLS Industry 
Effects
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
-37.373*** -22.627* -37.279*** -22.441* -45.715*** -10.450 -45.795*** -9.924
(0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.539) (0.000) (0.560)
-0.640 -1.396 -0.261 -0.988 0.249 -1.063 1.183 -0.310
(0.486) (0.123) (0.806) (0.345) (0.846) (0.402) (0.416) (0.829)
-0.052 -0.100** 0.072 0.027 -0.054 -0.071 0.011 0.014
(0.271) (0.031) (0.242) (0.657) (0.417) (0.278) (0.902) (0.869)
0.110*** 0.075*** 0.111*** 0.076*** 0.136*** 0.109*** 0.139*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.561 -0.681 -4.924 -6.134* -2.080 -1.333 -1.615 -4.350
(0.719) (0.656) (0.175) (0.084) (0.333) (0.526) (0.751) (0.381)
-0.730* -0.878** -1.062 -1.562 -1.093* -1.254** -0.210 -0.949
(0.091) (0.038) (0.514) (0.328) (0.071) (0.034) (0.927) (0.671)
0.150** 0.168** 0.141* 0.161** 0.375*** 0.316*** 0.363*** 0.307***
(0.043) (0.022) (0.059) (0.029) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
0.021 0.032 0.029 0.045* 0.020 0.034 0.007 0.049
(0.332) (0.127) (0.278) (0.083) (0.516) (0.263) (0.850) (0.181)
-0.003 0.000 -0.061* -0.052 0.019 0.010 0.003 -0.023
(0.900) (0.998) (0.093) (0.140) (0.607) (0.787) (0.954) (0.637)
0.336** 0.041 0.506*** 0.159 0.308 0.032 0.315 0.032
(0.015) (0.762) (0.003) (0.334) (0.116) (0.869) (0.182) (0.891)
-0.011 0.080 -0.164 -0.036 -0.067 -0.010 -0.149 -0.075
(0.900) (0.354) (0.113) (0.725) (0.593) (0.937) (0.308) (0.603)
0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.176*** 1.224*** 1.146*** 1.202*** 1.625*** 1.422*** 1.574*** 1.371***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5.286*** 4.285** 1.626 1.331 5.465** 3.891* 3.385 2.046
(0.002) (0.011) (0.449) (0.531) (0.020) (0.095) (0.254) (0.485)
-0.003 -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005* -0.005*
(0.151) (0.018) (0.224) (0.104) (0.202) (0.047) (0.061) (0.076)
0.001 0.005* 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.009* 0.004 0.004
(0.816) (0.100) (0.961) (0.423) (0.400) (0.053) (0.466) (0.419)
1.257 2.052* 2.494* 2.918** 2.102 2.482 3.098 3.858**
(0.300) (0.085) (0.075) (0.034) (0.217) (0.136) (0.112) (0.043)
0.722 0.097 0.701 0.067
(0.147) (0.859) (0.160) (0.903)
-0.166*** 0.023 -0.155*** 0.042
(0.005) (0.739) (0.009) (0.549)
0.345*** 0.221** 0.327*** 0.226**
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.028)
-0.763*** -0.061 -0.700*** 0.066
(0.000) (0.728) (0.000) (0.721)
-0.284 8.513*** -0.252 8.181***
(0.907) (0.002) (0.917) (0.003)
0.117*** 0.086*** 0.116*** 0.086***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.665*** 0.510*** 0.636*** 0.496***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
93.214*** 83.575*** 105.649*** 98.268*** 83.184*** 55.657*** 88.250*** 58.158*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.059)
151,142 151,142 151,142 151,142 80,287 80,287 80,287 80,287
6.07% 10.34% 6.17% 10.40% 6.95% 12.07% 7.11% 12.16%
- Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho - Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho
Overall R-Square
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test (Ho: error variance 
across all entities is zero. No panel effect, use OLS).
Reject Ho
Hausman Prob>chi2 (Ho: RE is an eff icient estimator)
Residual u(i,t) vs. Fitted Plots to detect evidence of non-
linearity, unequal error variances (Ho: random bounce and 
horizontal band around zero, few  outliers)
Moderately w ell-behaved
Regressions 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b use a smaller sample size due to limited source country information. After running 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a w ith the sample from the (b) 
regressions, the coeff ieicents magnitude, sign, and signif icance w ere not noticeably different from those found in (b), suggesting sample (b) is unbiased.
Mfg. Value Added (% of GDP), by 
Source
Constant
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1
Observations
Labor Tax & Contrib. (% of comm. 
profits), by Source
Profit Tax (% of comm. profits), by 
Source
Trade
Distance from Source Country (ths. 
miles), by Establishment
Cost to Export ($ ths. per container), 
by Source
Trade (% of GDP), by Source
Higher Ed. Revenue from Private 
Grants/Contracts ($ mil.), by Metro
Flagship Universities
S
ou
rc
e 
C
ou
nt
ry
Income
GDP per Capita ('05 $ ten ths.), by 
Source
Business 
Climate
A
gg
lo
m
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ba
se
d 
A
ss
et
s
Clusters
Four digit NAICS Specialization (LQ), 
by Metro
Four digit NAICS Employment in FOEs 
(ths.), by Metro
Metro
University 
Assets
Higher Ed. Research & Related 
Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro
International
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro
Population (mil.), by State
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by 
State
Tr
ad
e 
P
la
tfo
rm Domestic
Outflow s to Domestic (bn.), by Metro
Inflow s from Domestic (bn.), by Metro
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by 
Metro
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by 
Metro
GROUPS COVARIATES
Dependent: Average Number of Employees in Foreign-Ow ned Establishments
H
or
iz
on
ta
l M
ar
ke
t S
ee
ki
ng
Metro
Local Serving Industry (interact 
w /metro market size)
State
Pers. Inc. per Capita (ten ths.), by 
State
Table 7 (continued)
Determinants of Number of Employees in Foreign-Owned Establishment (One-Period Year of Investment)-Continued
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random 
Effects 
(All)
Random 
Effects
State 
Effects
Metro 
Effects
Metro 
State 
Effects
Industry 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects 
(Robust)
41.796*** 41.634*** 41.503*** 42.143*** 42.138*** 38.099*** 37.920*** 37.920***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.400*** 1.745*** 1.727*** 1.734*** 1.733*** 1.552*** 1.538*** 1.538***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.016*** 2.780*** 2.771*** 2.772*** 2.773*** 2.829*** 2.822*** 2.822***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.074*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
0.388* 1.142*** 1.135*** 1.168*** 1.174*** 1.202*** 1.191*** 1.191*
(0.063) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.076)
-4.034*** 1.189 0.894 1.111 1.145 -2.112 -2.460 -2.460
(0.002) (0.618) (0.707) (0.642) (0.631) (0.367) (0.293) (0.343)
-11.376*** -10.161*** -10.250*** -10.098*** -10.061*** -11.382*** -11.621*** -11.621***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.547** -1.090** -1.096** -1.098** -1.101** -1.117** -1.122** -1.122*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.050)
0.711*** 1.817*** 1.858*** 1.790*** 1.800*** 1.711*** 1.753*** 1.753*
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.070)
0.049 0.167*** 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.156** 0.159*** 0.159
(0.138) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.288)
11.837*** 11.104*** 11.127*** 10.953*** 10.959*** 9.018*** 9.047*** 9.047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
9.625*** 11.642*** 11.565*** 11.472*** 11.481*** 10.826*** 10.785*** 10.785***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-7.383*** -10.459** -18.039 3.461 70.814 -9.305** -4.941 -4.941
(0.002) (0.022) (0.226) (0.682) (0.300) (0.039) (0.737) (0.680)
-1.296 1.408 -27.355*** 9.359 -186.202 2.698* -24.885*** -24.885***
(0.125) (0.370) (0.000) (0.129) (0.356) (0.082) (0.000) (0.001)
0.207*** 0.338*** 0.172 0.148 0.165 0.385*** 0.199 0.199
(0.002) (0.007) (0.203) (0.269) (0.222) (0.002) (0.140) (0.436)
0.835** 1.305** -1.694** -2.052*** -2.183*** 1.244* -1.669** -1.669
(0.016) (0.045) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004) (0.056) (0.026) (0.403)
2.022*** 2.053*** 2.053*** 2.042*** 2.043*** 1.769*** 1.771*** 1.771***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-1.176 -3.041* 3.120 -1.345 -60.873 -1.538 0.965 0.965
(0.174) (0.057) (0.607) (0.781) (0.355) (0.331) (0.872) (0.889)
0.082* 0.191** 0.085 0.174* 0.150 0.205** 0.096 0.096
(0.079) (0.030) (0.403) (0.085) (0.141) (0.019) (0.346) (0.568)
0.089* 0.162 0.051 0.075 0.064 0.197* 0.069 0.069
(0.087) (0.110) (0.642) (0.484) (0.560) (0.052) (0.527) (0.664)
-0.538*** -0.962*** 0.207 -1.938*** -1.237 -0.730*** 0.187 0.187
(0.000) (0.000) (0.287) (0.000) (0.796) (0.000) (0.331) (0.389)
0.058*** 0.034** 0.032** 0.026* 0.027* 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.000) (0.022) (0.030) (0.073) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.272*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.334*** 0.334*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.323**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
0.001 0.002* -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002** -0.001 -0.001
(0.188) (0.081) (0.362) (0.116) (0.393) (0.031) (0.387) (0.657)
0.037** 0.060** 0.051* -0.007 -0.000 0.053** 0.052* 0.052
(0.011) (0.027) (0.072) (0.815) (0.992) (0.049) (0.071) (0.357)V
er
tic
al
 F
ac
to
r S
ee
ki
ng
Labor Factors
Employment (ths.), by four digit NAICS 
& Metro
Comp. per Worker ($ ten ths.), by four 
digit NAICS & Metro
Human Capital
Residents w / Bachelor's Degrees 
(ths.), by State
Bachelor's/Post-Bach. Degrees & 
Certif icates Conferred (ths.), by Metro
Establishment Subsidy Value ($ mil.), 
by Establishment
Labor Law
Right to Work (binary), by State
Employed Represented by Union (%), 
by State
Minimum Wage ($), by State
Cost of Living Regional Price Parities (index), by 
State-Metro Portion
Trading Status
Exports and Imports (binary), by 
Establishment
Imports (binary), by Establishment
B
us
in
es
s 
C
lim
at
e
Taxes
Domestic Tax Haven (binary), by State
No Income Tax (binary), by State
Corporate Income Tax Rate (%), by 
State
Value Added Tax Rate (%), by State
Subsidies
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) out-
of-State, by Establishment
Foreign Status
Foreign-Ow ned (binary), by 
Establishment
Originated as Greenfield (binary), by 
Establishment
Originated as M&A (binary), by 
Establishment
M&A Event (binary), by Establishment
Post M&A Event (binary), by 
Establishment
Years Post M&A, by Establishment
Table 8
Determinants of Number of Employees in Foreign-Owned Establishment (Time-Series)
GROUPS COVARIATES
Dependent: Number of Employees in Establishments
E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t C
on
tro
ls
General 
Characteristics
Headquarters (binary), by 
Establishment
Age (years), by Establishment
Parent-ow ned Employment (ths.) in-
State, by Establishment
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random 
Effects 
(All)
Random 
Effects
State 
Effects
Metro 
Effects
Metro 
State 
Effects
Industry 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects
Industry 
State 
Effects 
(Robust)
-42.943*** -62.922*** -62.492*** -60.786*** -60.924*** 18.303 21.604 21.604
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.221) (0.437)
0.232 0.814 0.640 0.834 0.474 0.980 0.772 0.772
(0.536) (0.247) (0.403) (0.369) (0.614) (0.162) (0.311) (0.677)
-0.024 0.003 0.155*** 0.855*** 0.808*** 0.001 0.121** 0.121
(0.232) (0.937) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.976) (0.013) (0.195)
0.054*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.020 0.022 0.022
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.241) (0.203) (0.524)
1.240** 2.243** 5.142*** 4.475*** 5.241*** 2.121** 4.796*** 4.796**
(0.018) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.031)
-0.428*** -0.761*** 1.347*** -0.406 -0.018 -0.779*** 1.472*** 1.472
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.242) (0.972) (0.000) (0.001) (0.145)
0.357*** 0.639*** 0.629*** 0.612*** 0.618*** 0.487*** 0.475*** 0.475***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.005 0.002 -0.014 -0.008 -0.029 -0.029
(0.712) (0.924) (0.623) (0.731) (0.315) (0.549)
0.006 0.015 -0.046 0.047 0.002 0.002
(0.743) (0.639) (0.294) (0.127) (0.967) (0.983)
0.410*** 0.589*** 0.608*** 0.460*** 0.432** 0.432
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.212)
-0.248*** -0.387*** -0.439*** -0.351*** -0.358*** -0.358
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.148)
0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.417*** -0.660*** -0.680*** -0.675*** -0.675*** -0.685*** -0.706*** -0.706***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.022 -0.695 -13.636*** 1.423 -8.766*** -8.766**
(0.357) (0.738) (0.000) (0.492) (0.002) (0.017)
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.372) (0.388) (0.864) (0.410) (0.489) (0.541) (0.931) (0.965)
-0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.040)
-3.549*** -6.145*** -5.139*** 41.065 118.967 -5.566*** -5.520*** -5.520
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.659) (0.477) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117)
111.221*** 185.148*** 78.760*** 188.677* -28.650 108.871*** 24.006 24.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.948) (0.000) (0.256) (0.476)
1,947,991 1,026,137 1,026,137 1,026,137 1,026,137 1,026,137 1,026,137 1,026,137
244,249 125,689 125,689 125,689 125,689 125,689 125,689 125,689
5.98% 5.55% 5.61% 5.75% 5.73% 10.09% 10.14% 10.14%
- - Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho
- -
Reject Ho 
(for 
states)
Reject Ho 
(for 
metros)
Reject Ho 
(for 
metros 
states)
Reject Ho 
(for 
industry)
Reject Ho 
(for 
industry)
Reject Ho 
(industry)
Residual u(i,t) vs. Fitted Plots to detect evidence of non- Moderately w ell-behaved
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test (Ho: error variance Reject Ho
Hausman Prob>chi2 (Ho: RE is an eff icient estimator)
Wald Test on geography, industry, and time effects (Ho: 
coeff icients are jointly equal to zero)
Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation (Ho: Residuals u(i,t) Residuals are w eakly correlated.
Flagship Universities
Constant
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1
Observations
Number of Establishments
Overall R-Square
Exports ($ bn.), by Metro
Imports ($ bn.), by Metro
A
gg
lo
m
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ba
se
d 
A
ss
et
s
Clusters
Four digit NAICS Specialization (LQ), 
by Metro
Four digit NAICS Employment in FOEs 
(ths.), by Metro
Metro
University 
Assets
Higher Ed. Research & Related 
Expenses ($ mil.), by Metro
Higher Ed. Revenue from Private 
Grants/Contracts ($ mil.), by Metro
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by 
Metro
State
Pers. Inc. per Capita (ten ths.), by 
State
Population (mil.), by State
Population (hnd. ths.) x Local Ind., by 
State
Tr
ad
e 
P
la
tfo
rm Domestic
Outflow s to Domestic (bn.), by Metro
Inflow s from Domestic (bn.), by Metro
International
Table 8 (continued)
Determinants of Number of Employees in Foreign-Owned Establishment (Time-Series)-Continued
GROUPS COVARIATES
Dependent: Number of Employees in Establishments
H
or
iz
on
ta
l M
ar
ke
t S
ee
ki
ng
Metro
Local Serving Industry (interact 
w /metro market size)
Pers. Inc. per Capita ($ ten ths.), by 
Metro
Population (hnd. ths.), by Metro
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